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Pre:rac·e 
This study was undertaken to satisfy ·a curiosity 
regarding the ganer 1 thinking y organized labor on currant 
wage incent:l.ve practices. 'or several years the writer has 
. 
·been engaged in developing and administering wage incentive.s, 
and ha s aa a result been expos d to verbal opinions of a wide 
variety l'elati ve to the subject. 'J.lheae opinions were lar ,ely 
from t he worl{ers and minor union of.ficials in intimate contact 
:rith t he incentive. 'rha attempt of' this investigation, then, 
is t o determine the official attitudes oi: top laoor leader• 
ship , and the policies of labor unions here wage incentives 
are involved~ 
Beyond t h is initial curiosity there was also t he 
problem of the manner in which the rec·ent strength of organ-
ized la bor has changed older principle of seientific manage-
ment . The type of unionism wh ich is today -oasoclated ith 
the Congress of Industrial 0l"gan1zat1ons: and a 1mil1ar unions 
is ectually but some t~if'teen yeara strong , and ita opinions 
on the .sub jeet h ve only recent ly caused partial control and 
modification of wage incentives~ Prior to wide-spread union• 
.ism in industry, management generally determined the manner 
in hieh scientific management was to be app!1ed .. - There were 
ocatt<U''ed exceptions to this, of course, but the prerogative 
of t:;B~ablish1ng incentives and adminis tering details wae 
lar . ely one of management alone. 
li"urthermore, the ma ss production industrial economy 
o:t: the United States is uut some sixty years ol d , nd still 
·xp ndin ' • Tv~o of' t he factors uh i ch c nn wel l determine i n -
dus trl l. progrcs i n th ne~ t si.: ty years ar the a tt i t u.d 
of 1 oor, ·. nd i t::: produc t ivity . The manner in •1h 1ch s t r kes 
on the railroads in 1946 , nd in coal cl ux•ing 1949 and 1950 
paral ~ zed industry s peaks . or t he dependence ot the e cono:my 
on lA bor •s cooper t1on . :vhile· i t is r e cogn i zed t h t the con -
tr1out1ons of cap ital and anag me n t ere s imili rly i mportant , 
t his study 7ns of l bor alone . Produc tive e1"fic1ency is l lke-
ise dependent to large pz~rt on the cooper tion of l a or , 
nd wh i l e i t .ay ue i n<'}roase - i. th nee incentives , the:z:e .us t 
De an accep tanc of these inc· nt 1V(;) oy l bor if long - ·tvrm 
g ·i n a ~re to e real ized . 
I n t he current t:r•end , effect ive opposition t o add i -
tion al 'I ge 1ncrea~te s m . 1 11 ceune l aoo:r t o ch n~e its im-
m.ed1 te ob j e c t ives . Onc e the pension nd associ ted soci l 
conces sions hav evelop od to a point where further gn lns ar•e 
no t nossibl , l nuor m~y 'ell look to w .[; ...., i nc<mtives s e 
me n s of 1mprovinn noruinfll "I . .:.e s . The , pha s i will bo on 
t he work r .nd l is produc t 1~1ty 1 nd it i even cone ivsol.e 
th~t 1 '36 incentives 111 r e turn to the Butomot ive industry 
under joint union- m na ement; c ontrol .. :.:n ~ny event ,. n ex .. 
pans ion i n the u se of' i nc nti ve -y :tndus t:ry is an tic ipated . 
T'nere r surpr1sin ·~ly t: ev1 t xts 1 vot :;,d to a 
study of l aoor •s t t itud e on the 'lag e .tncent ive is s ue . Vol • 
umes de voted e.xclusivelJ to o s tudy of i ncentive sys tel!ls , 
time. s tudy , sc1ent1i'ic management, and related topics are 
numerous. ·ut concernine labor'$ attitudes &nd thinki ng , 
it :ra s necessary to refer to specific sections or chapters 
tor information. 1 any and v ried art.icles llet•e contained 
in labor and industrial par1od1osls, raost or them 1r1tten 
by l bor leaders. Two out standing volumes, though, rei'J.ect 
t he intensive 1nvest1Ga t1ons by Profe·ssor Sumner II ,. Sliohter, 
'nd V n Dusen Kennedy into t he matter. 
It was necess-.ry, then, to solicit help f'l:'om unions 
t hrough di r ect mail solic1·t ations. Comprehensive research 
as also necessary tio extract £rom r~tin .;is on the labor prob-
le t hose pprt1ons h ich could be applied to t his study. 
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Chapter ~ 
nagament Objectives, · nd Current, _. ae .Incentive P~ana 
A • . Purp_o_aes of.. Inoent1vea 
-- l . a· 
The two pasic methods o:t' wage p ym nt at•e payment 
ror time orked, and payment tor worker product! vi ty. The 
~atter type hafJ changed .f'rom e rly pl ns .· h1ch caleul ted 
a ges entirely .f'rom a piece count of units. produo.ed during a 
pl~edetel"mined period of t1me1 or imposed low tasks for below 
standard performance, M1nim.um wage lav1a currently pl ce a 
floor to whieh .age incentives increase income in theoretical 
amounts oo enaul"ate ith increases in iiOrker pvoduotivity • 
.!ont wage incentives to meet the leg 1 requirements on hourly 
ages, t hen, must provide time guarantees. In this respect 
they are -somewhat 1m111ar to the old ~~nnohe·ater Plan. Low 
task in any event cannot fall below tho legal minimum exoopt 
in those few apac1t1o industries ·exexnpt £rom the Fair L bor 
Standard:~ Act. 
In his excellent writings on age incentives, Lytle 
points out that c 
The pr1r::tary and universal re son for t he 
installation of wag pay ant plans is 
tod y, aa ever, to secure -the lowering 
of unit total costs on tho one hand, and 
to 1mp:rove 'the earnings o±" the employees 
on the other·. ( l) 
That such o jeetivea can be obtained only where labor 1a paid 
(l) Charles 1 • Lytle., V age Incentive Methoda, 1946, page 53 
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in relation to perform nee i ;v ithout question . Such bae1c 
met~ od h ve been employed t'or y~ r in . a le a fNOt':: wh r 
co 1sa1ona actually rapre . nt incentiv :~ arnings. ~ ere sale• 
salaries paid f o1• on 
.· re only ecause or p ·r t1cular circuxn ·tance , i t i noub t .ful 
:tf p:r a r1t large ;otar ko t.e oul l xlet .. 
Any wage 1neenti ve pl s.n 1 ztepudla.t:ton of ti e P•Y· 
ment 1ia.h has any limit tion if one is ve.ferring 'co oper• 
tions suitable tor A waee incentive, 1~lorketta g(;)ne .r ll net 
their own pace at apeE)da l ·o ar than would be maintained under 
ge inctmt1vea.. In calculating c-ost estimate 1 engineer . o:t 
t he Wecrt .1nghouse Electric Corpo:r.~a tion use 1,67 el paed hour 
in p epai'ing manufacturing ooat on a unit of productJ.on under 
a time payment plan; whlch re·quir es but 1.00 hour to eomplote 
under the stimulus of a wage incentive. Time ayment fails 
to ndequatel7 compensate the more 3k:1lled worl:er expending 
E;l"OfltOl'! otf·ort: ~WhO may be in the aame hourly wage bracket W1 th 
alower worker .. It certa ... nl.y requires more nd clooer super-
vision.. In t h final nalyaia~ time payment doea not lower 
unit costa or !ncreaae employees' earnings . 
Payment l n rolstion to performance is neceasary for 
several reason~, ch1e.t of which are t he d..:.f.ference which ex-
1st between worker• on s1mil1ar joba. Peraonnel technique• 
havo pro rea ed into elaborate and detailed systems of worker 
. I 
selection, endeavoring to employ the beat type av iln le. A 
further employer safeguard is c·ontained in a ajori t y of' 1 bor 
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contracts under the n1anagerial clause permitting di missal 
during the probat1onal'y p~r10d of unsuitable employees who 
have aomel:!:ow p ased through the processes of personnel e-
lection. Desp1t these precaut1ons 1 t here remains tb,e. problem 
of individual . ppl1cat1on to tasks in varyinr.r degrees .. y 
different worker• • 
Individual productivity differs betw~en employees 
of t h s o 1 or grade, performing identic l operations, and 
posess1ng qualities sufficient to h ve met the listed job 
peci.fications.. Equal productlv1 ty, t hen, is someth i ng ex• 
pocted of automatic machines, •nd not .of the human orke.r., 
Skill and ef fort play sn important p rt in oxpl 1n1ng the 
differences \Vhich exiet in productivity bet .een orkers, but 
intelligence, trn1n1ng, and general app11c tion to task ala.o 
exist in different levels# and do i n fluence production. 
The f1r.st general purpose of ws·ge 1ncent1ve·s, then, 
is to reimburse labor by amounts .in relation . to production . 
Underlying this is the attempt to maximize output t the low• 
est t otal cost per unit . Since it is recognized tht labor 
1 in most · instances merely one .of the factora in total product 
cost, 1t is accepted t h t equal attent1·on is devoted to the 
remaining i'ao.tors. But the origin l intent to reimburse 1 bor 
for incre sad production is present • . Premium and bonu plana 
in general '£ 11 to compensate orkers in direct .proportion to 
1ncre sed output. . anagement haa been ware o.f these differ• 
encea, l r gely because o:f increasing union opposition , and 
a 
the cm .. rent trend is to ar d compensation 1.n d:trec t pro .. 
portion to additional output. The gl"Oup ayate~ of age in• 
cent:ive p ay ant is another plan :rh ioh VIh~le it may i ncrea ae 
wo gaa in direct l'elation to pl~ oductivity., does not compensate 
i ndividual worl{ers :tn dil"ect relation to t he contributions 
toward output oi' .,ach memoez• of the group.. Gt~oup wa e in-
centives ar•a accepted by both partieo due to t' a e.aae or 
coveror,e extended to production al'ea s h ich othenr...ae :tould 
be without an incentive syatel!l for 1ont of either lo1or adm1n1e.-
trut on co ta , or su ... ficient foundation for individual in-
nd Effort 
. . -• 
1 . Productivity 
Lo¥ mol ... la on. th~ p 1rt o:r' 'iOrl{er;J wil l 
reduce t he;h• p:roductivity.. A man ger 
'li tho is noted -or his unf 1rneaa nd lll 
temper cann·ot aecur·e the ~ ooperat1 ve 
a:fi'o1•t of the beat Ol"kez•a. On the 
other hand, a genuine and hones-t system 
of lncent-ve age poyrnent.sf may grantly 
at ilnula te productivity. (lJ 
Hopkins- 1a referring to orlte r affo:vt, nattU"ally1 
fox> any disouauion of productivity under wage incentive 
system as compared with a t1me• wor ked baaia of payment 1s 
simply a comparison o:f effort. The quality and .!'low of ma-
terials ;. eapacitirs o:e n1achines, and w·ork1ng cond1t 1ona iW 
i mportant as factora in production are not under cone1dera t1on . 
Of the t hree ele :nental factors of' economic pro-
(1) •r • J • Hopkins , L bor i n the Americ n Economy, 1948; page 99 
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c1:!:tctlon ter t.d ~ nd, 1 ~. ·or, aud .c:lp_ ·i.~ll ., t' is paper ::...: con• 
c"'x·n~d i th la bo ~ a lone . La· or cont1.··1· ut es t o pl"Odu t i vi t y 
c ::.ief'l·c t • r ouj::t tt.e a,ppl ic t io:r of s11l l · a -;.d e f .:'or-t. .;)ir..~.;e 
1:111 is n t 1ln6 ~120 e tl ... n profi~iency ~~t .fol lo.J<ing a .,.ive 
metL d , i.t :..s assurrted t:b.a · u.nd - r a 1 ge incentive plan sltill 
dsy ork met od of ramun~r-
at ion . T1 :L .. l-ea\' :;S effort , then, as t ... e l one v~ r i · l e f actor 
1 3 st~dy of' pr· odn~ tiv~.ty under the 'bvro d :!.v r ent vaa-e 1:' y -
:r• _l o .ion o"" orker effort ,. 
Tho crt;her hw.nan f ctors · hie could pos 1 ly e i n -
di seua.,. ion of pl"C• 
l abol .. r ela t i ons .. L'1. OlU' · r e ent; c o .ony of la-· ··e c orpor a tions 
wi t 1 widel ~ .!.Gld owr <;I·sh_p, t he p :r., s onne l cont :r:tuuting to 
rra·n "'ement ~ nd lt!' or rel at i ons -~re i@lti'ully c ptlrt of our 
l8bor f o.rcc . :th· s ·u er excludes t on. howe er , b ceu~e of 
t heir ~dv _need pos i t1on1 and conaider·s: only t he :v-Jorl.er to 
whom t he· i ncentive i s di r ec t l y appli ed •. 
2 .• Eff ort . 
·rrnit c oot s are l O'itered, and workers' earnings in• 
er e aed under a wnge incentive 1 r gely t hr ough t he ef fort 
factor of t h e o:r."ker. Stimula t ion of effort, t h en, is t h e 
ch.ief goal or any good wage i ncentive. 
T'ne moe t pot ent .factor in aecut'ing large 
profits is the avoidance of waste, and. 
t he greatest source of waste in t h e i n• 
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d1v1dual world is unused, undeveloped, or 
miesd1rected human effort. 
The industrial superiority of America is 
largely due to the absence of restriction 
upon indi vidual eff ort to t he encour ge-
ment ·Of t he individual by giving him t he 
trui s or his efforts . 
If you wa$te human effort you m ke t he 
product cos t more. I f you :ra1.•e prices 
without ~ncreasing incomes you ha ve not 
made mora work for more people. You have 
J.nerely g1 van people leas tor their mon• 
ey . (1} · 
A simple definition of e.f:fort ie merely reflection 
o:f the orkor•a mental ttitude toward his as•1gned task . [en-
t•l attitudes in tUl'n may be influenced by working eond1t1ona, 
health, d1stract1ona, feelings concerning management , and gen• . 
eral discontent or appree1ot1on or we.gea. While ll of these 
f ctors contribute t o total eff ort, the latt er point ha the 
.. oat influenta.l ef'foct, tor t he returns are more . bnned1 te, 
nd the satisfaction mor e person 1. S1nee wage i ncent ives 
directly affect remuneration , 1t is et tl1is point t hat effort 
o n e greatl y increased. Ch ngEu~ i n worker mental tt itudea 
re t hus rought about when effort increases 1n anticipation 
of gx-e t er i ncome through exp nding production . 
The direct econ.omio ram1f1c tiona of changes in 
worker eff ort are i mportant. The installati on of wa ge in• 
centive& does influence orker pplioat!on to t ask , and 1.f the 
i ncentives re adm1n1atered fairly and i ntelligently, e:f'.t'ort 
(l) Judge Louis D. r ndeia, Fr .eedom of Enterl?r1ae , reprint 
·O.t' an acidreas efore the oaton dentl'a1 Labor dnlon in 1905, 
University Preaa , Gambridge. Maa.e., April 1949 
ll 
can e markedly increased. Of" oouxwse the opposite is equally 
true but we shall assume that mana l)ament in genll)ral has come 
or a ge equal to the d<tmands of more enl.ightened labor unionism. 
Increased effort , then, reduces the product cost in sever l 
way • I t 1ncreeaes produ.ct1 vi ty end reduces d1I•eet labor cost a 
from the higher requ1r.em.ant• of a day o·rk plan. By lowering 
t he direct labor element of unit cos t it moves units thr.ough 
production procetHI:ee more quickly· s.nd in this m.nnn r reduces 
fixed charges. Wlth lower selling prices it is an aid to 
maximizing revenue hich otherw1 e could not be attained, par• 
ticularly 11' the demand tor the produce '1s elastic. Supply 
can be accommodated quicker through shorter delivery dates , 
snd can also be st1mulat·ed through this medium. Ef"for t, then. 
1s the important factor of.' productivity which can e incr eased 
with t he adaptation of a wage 1ne.ent.ive. 
c., Other Fact ors Favorabl.e To Mansgem,ent 
1. BargainingAdvantagea 
In a.ddi tion to the increases 1n ·effort and pro-
ductivity explnined in earlier pa (:)es, the dv ·ntages of wage 
incentive systems to management are many and varied . A fore-
most advant ge is the bar gaining posit ion af't'orded anagem.ent 
.on matters of basic houx•ly 'Nago ra tea. flhen demands :for high• 
er hourly wage rates are suom1tted, management frequently 
calla attention to the average hourly nomin l wage rate 1n an 
attempt to aoften or el1m1n te the requested inereaaes. Thua 
in plant 1th . n hourly ase rate of 1 1.00, and an average 
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incentive multiplier of 130 per cent,. the vernge hourly 
nominDl r te figures to 1 . 30 . Bonus avera ge are frequently 
employed in the a me m nnor during wage negotiation • 
Identi cal claims are made y personnel interviewer• 
as 1ndueementa to prospective employees. lt is expl 1ned 
t hat while tho hourly .ge rate at t he time of employment may 
be rel t:tv.ely low, t ha chance to increase w.eekly take home 
p y is excellent since t h e worker will e absorbed 1n n in-
centive system iTlth a history . These management counter pro• 
posals or sugQe1t1ons presuppos e t hat etter equipment , tool a., . 
or orking conditions have contributed to t he L1.centiv e .rn .. 
1nga. n gement forgets ., however, that the incentive plan 
w s accepted by the orkers with the understanding that ase 
rates would represent 1n most negotiated contracts, going 
hourly rates. Incentive earnings, t hen; ere to result from 
output vove verage performance . 
2. Better Iethods 
A auggeation prograli1 with monetary award is actually 
o forra of \. a ge incentive payment. If such a program is 1n 
effect,. the savings are orth many times over the amounts re• 
turned as. $ ard , and usually both parties to t he sugbestion 
· re · 8t1st'1ed. nut method developed by o~lt:ers .after in-
centive rat s have been established are frequently discovered 
and 1n talled aa normal pr ocedure. Often it h ppen t ha t 
these i mproved changes in methods remain hidden or are o f: such 
in 1gn1f1cant amount that the changing of standards is neglect-
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ed. w .en hare the co t.rlbution. to h i gher production 
usu lly h1eh enough to mo e than cover the looa n s . of th 
e ta 'lished stond!lrd . 
Large m nufac i~urinc-.; astsbl1shL1ents :tn ddit1on to 
e par!enced er onnel in production prol)lams ,. empl oy on-
lneer t ·or t h e sola purpose of i mproving me thods . In • 
di tion, designers, draft amen, foremen, .nd all those serv:te1ng 
t h e product are briefed from time to time in methods 1mprovo-
ments . But with 11 these safegua1~d , jobs y remain in 
ass.embl y for years unti l a orker in the factory devises a 
new method oi~ perform!n his operation :rhich is ""uper1or to 
the old manner o.f ork• Some firms r eserve the right to 1n• 
corp or te methods changes devol oped by worlreru into stand rd 
procedure. If an ward sy tem for su gestions is in force, 
these .firms point out that t he worker· h ad prel1r.ll1na:ry recourse 
to t hese f c111t1es. I.f no a.ward system tor suggestiona ha• 
been provided, t hey cleim the n1ethods improvements were the 
re·sul t o:f company environment, or· that at ndard v. luea are ad-
equate enough ithout e.,..osion. 1..n any event, wage incentive 
systems enl ar ~e the ti!ethods Department to 1 clt1de all wo.rker~ 
under t he system. 
3. Qlltput 
Under a y 1noent1 ve program. with e1 ther ·stand rd 
value ba..,.ed upon e tlm; ted or time studie~ d ta, or upon ne• 
gotietad piece rates, mens gement has s f oundation up on h 1ch 
to me sure performance . 'l'here 1 de.f1n1 te knowledge of h ow 
much a worker can accomplish in a c~rt in :mount of time . 
ithout such standards, past production records or eatimatee 
or future production are used in production planning and 
acheduling . There is a good eati ate-, i n any case, of how 
much labor 1s required to complete a ·g1v n set of operat ions,, 
and the lengt h or time wh.1ch these operations 111 require. 
\'1th t hese · easurea,. production c n be channeled correctly, 
. nd 1th .ood timing . Production oottle ... neeks can be spotted 
quickly . A eert 1n amount of confidence is lao present, for 
given • normal set of conditions, management can expect pre-
determined production quotas wi th good accuracy. V'fuere t here 
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is good measurement ot performance, then, the quality of plant 
planning · nd 1 yout of tae1l1t1ea., and production planning and 
-.oheduling ahould be high . Close pertoi'111ance mea:surement alao 
faell.1tatea method• analya1a and cost reductions. the preparation 
of proper es.tint&tea tor talea negotiations., and accurate udget• 
ary control for manufaetu1'"1ng d.epartment••· 
4 . Reduce• SJ201led ~ ork 
l~oat . age 1ncent1 ve progra a provide that work 
spoiled by poor or m.1sd1reeted skill shall be repaired with-
out additi onal labor ·at nda:rd•. under a bonus plan, work 
spoil ge 111 sh ow t1rat 1n the production record and s.econdly 
t h rough a. redueed bonua. With a piece work system 1 t reflects 
more effectively in the pay envelope. The penalty attached 
to spoiled w-ork, then,. 1.s a stimulus to watchtulne•• · 
Since it may not be economical in all 1nst noes of' 
spoiled work to require that repairs in labor houra be carried 
out at the employee's expense, there are some deviations . De-
.fecta of pre-ceding operations found after a job has been moved 
to subsequent orker or groups are u ually not corrected on 
the mrker 1 s earned time .unless a bonuD plan of general cover• 
age :1 t he ethod of payment. ~ 1'here auoh spoilage 1a not 
corrected on e rned t1:me, there is s l)reater ins1 tenoe that 
inspection be mo.re thorough before jobs are transferred or 
subsequent operations.. 1V1th such inspection requirements , the 
burden for correction is beck at the source of' error. 
5. Reductions in Personnel 
It ~ounds inconceivable that union em erB should 
dea1re reduot!ona in the numbe:r of wox•kera engaged in pro-
ductive operations, but it does occur in iaoleted 1nstancea 
under incentive w ge plans. This 1$ la.r gely true where ork 
crewa ere organized into groups, and the incentive is pe.id on 
a group bas·is. 
Assume a group of ten operator.a completing .... 20 unit• 
of production 1n 400 houra weekly under a straight piece work 
arran ~eraent. If production requirements are lowered to 460 
units eekly, and the ork1ng force remains unchanged, the 
earnings· a ave base hourly wage rates drop £rom 30 per cent 
to 15 per cent. There are· requests from the group workers 
who hesitate to accept reduced &9rnings to cut t he ork force 
,1n the group y s ·ome appr·o.x.ima te number. Dependent upon con-
tractual obligations;. the group 1s e1 the1~ reduced through the 
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:;eniority gr ement~ or of the slowest workar. Such ·1nstsnoea 
re extremely sensitive to the loe 1, and while t e ene:ral 
policy of the union ould not accept such a aanct1on of.f1.o1ally, 
t he el mor trom within the rank and tile of the, group frequent-
l y prevails.. Oftentime• enagem.ent pr.efera to maintain in• 
centi ve e rninga at naatiafa.cto:ry" level a and makes it e aier 
on t he union through leyoff'e or· f'urlou hts which are accepted 
without too much protest. 
9• Poliei,n5 and Supet-v1a1on 
Individuals on piece work adjust them.selve• to pro• 
. ' .t 
duct' ion require ents. Group te.nd to. set their o n levels 
. . , . •'!.: : .. 
and to police the group with :re spec t t o s~~1~!'J 1_ e delays. 
Both individual p.1eoe workers and groups request the correct-
ion of unavoidable delays C8US8d 'by fact ors .from With out • 
The dri".ring type of superv1.s1on frequently necess ry 
when work 1$ paid or on a time b& is-, ·nd no labor measure-
ment of product exis t;•, 1s not neoeasal'y. Group members tend 
to prod s.lo er orkera toward the group average level of pro..-
duct!on 8nd performance. Personal time and other a1mil1ar 
avoidable delay are alao .reduced to an pprox1mate group 
average which etill permits acdeptable incentive earnings. 
Slm1l1:ar •elf pol1c1ng 1s cerr1ed out by the 1nd1v1dua,1 piece 
worker. Supervision is· fre e to devote n,wre t1.me to pet-aonnel. 
problema, production schedules, cnrry1ng out directed plant 
pol1cies~ 1nd fulfilling dutiEUf more 1 port nt t han how long 
n individual . spends. in the ash roo111 each morning . 
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?. Miscellt~tneous 
-
There re other r easons why ruanac;ert.tent may pre!'er• 
.incentives 1hieh deserve l>r1ef mention . ·. 1nor repairs to 
mach i nes n ay 'be delayed i n expectation that tna .or e1•s will 
increase personal E>ffort to make up the dif.ference, Or the 
improvement ot. .. mor le and ita continuance at a sstiBfactory 
plane y be de.sired by a ·. anegement Vii th r:t 1 bor force v:hioh 
accept w. ge 1ncent1 ves a .a a means ot' 1ncrerUl1ng nominal a ges. 
demand of 
D. Selection Of a Plen 
Probably the a.ll•important f ~tu:res mana gement should 
wage lne ntive plan are t hat it ln~reaae production 
in t he t ce of h i gher l bol' earnings , de·crease total cos t e. 
and affeet worker lUO·t·ale .r. vorably. Lytle 11 ts certain 
e'Js nt als w' 1ch an incentive plan should posess: be related 
to other management e ont:rols, nas1st supervi ion,. and have 
both employee and mnn&.gerinl nupport. (l) These u1•o. too baaic 
tor further elabor tion. Loude-n goes even further in listing 
basic equ 1rement:a of n sound incentive plan • . (2) There 1a 
aome overlapping by both wr1teXts which are eonaO.lidetod into 
the seven requirement s listed on following p ·ges . IJ."'he follow-
ing f'eaturee have been. selected .for oona1de;rat1on ~,y mana ge-
ments 1nst lllng w ge incentive plans. 
l. Ease of Measurement 
:rn. weighing the merits of in•tall1ng e w EJO. incentive 
(l) Charles ll ., Lytle, Wage Inoenttvo t ethoda, 1946, pa ge ?1 
(2) J. K . Louden, Wa s;e Incent1 ves, '1944, pa ges 4.6-48 
le 
r,l r:i .1, a f'irm. .. h ould deter·...n ine the c tent to . hich the ork 
can e mensured . i 1th ma3 production of a stcndardiz •d. unit 
sueh as certain m.eno ' su1to or ar.wll electric otora, oper-
a-tio 1s can be meosurQd easily nnd value assigned quickl y . 
t'vueth er tl ese volues have een obtained fro· time studies., 
ast production records, entit:~f .e ,. or negotiatior.1a, the oper-
~ 
nt1ons or·e oaoic and have o .his tory. The noundnes of te 
ia gu l'antiead dopendtnt only upon t e selection of the proper 
pe Ronnel to A . __ n! · t e i• t; e deta : 1 • Oparntions are lso 
meosured at relatively lo.v coat . Good values need o:nly be 
rev1e ved ·1 tl cl ane os in uethod, and worker m.ors. le lhich is 
easily d pt.-l d thr oug..~ corz octe rate cl n es can _e ra; in-
tf.l nod nt prav1ou av rage • 
Arguments are advanc d ";b.nt the science o .eos·ure-
e t ha~ p •ogre:used until now it 1 pos, 1 1 t;o aesi .-n values 
to nny type o£ ·1nnual v10rk 1 t h ·oocl degree o£ ocur . cy . 
Such .t: os si 111 ties may be technicnlly correct ut the chances 
of' direct Gpplica t ion to each jou ·re ro1ote . To '-iuil a 
taule of atnil d ele nto or b ale operat~ons on a pac1 1 
lor e piece or apia atus in a jo rdf;l"' shop i oth costly 
ond 1 racticsl. ':his i s not to ln!'er that vnl ues suit ble 
to good w ~ 1ncs Lt1ve c nnot e o Jerm1ned, but merely 
~.11 .,trates t ·1a · az rds of such rates . 
Labor requ1ro that w g incentiv s e j ust , nd 
l'Osponsible 'lEma . o~:1ent at t empts to meet t is request ! th 
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~:lyatemo en~ tributin to tha bene.fit of both . Such a sy tem 
promot s te~mworL end re . pect on both sides, and asserts it .. 
s lf in th r duc ·c1on i ndex . Ju.stice to both sides 1 be• 
cod i ng :n.o'I•e nd morv to : ean · ddition 1 :;:•ew rd ovor ba..,e 
ro t , i n d i rect proport:t on to :t:ncre sed productivity ~bove 
t u stand~ rd a v :r. ere . I n brie.f ., it means- r; .... ne:r•ou r .r; rd. 
P.r .mium r bonus .:/1.. ns in g eneral f 11 in t'1i 
. ,.. !~ pect . end for this reason these pltms meet :vi th th~ dis -
f~vor o:t.' 1 · b or . .! nn,~en<.ent h s recogn:t "'ed thi reluctonc 
"'nd h s en adopting the Standsrd Hou:r type of me surement 
w:i.th rev . :rd i n d.ir ct relation to incre""ses in output. 'i1her . 
are no p on, 1 ttes o ttaeh .... d 1 and if 1nd1v1du 1 ope l"BtOl'S ot· 
eroup~ f il to re . ch the 100 per cent ve.rsge of' task in 
given pay period, no carry-over of units to be produced on 
t he v.r.orke:r t s time i s tt chad. This is · t'eir srr . ngement # 
for in a majority of o&o:!as short gos or material, reduced pro• 
duot1on :1ch d.ules, o.r ~ oxua other cau es beyond the control ot 
t he · orker pl .. avent !nee tive ea.rnlngs.. The rovi rd& n:re real 
Q.nd imm.adl te. and generally nre paid s direct · dditions to 
tho · · · se no 1inul wa :e. Such rran omenta c n oe e mployed on 
:.nost types of: manuf'ac t ur:tng , large nu.~b.er o... oerv1c1ng 1n-
dustr1eo, and ,re -e-qually suitable t individual or group in-
centive . 
It .is r~.cogni~ed t .n t many of tba pram1u.m or bonua 
plans are suitabl to individual companies where standard de .... 
tennin tlon is derived :ro p st perto:mnanee. To install 
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scour te atandards· ould in some eases be costly to the point 
oi' prohibiting age incentives. and it is here t hat t heae 
plana are approved . 
3. Group Incentives 
· hether to use group incentive in preference to 
individual wage incentive payment is a decision which must 
be carefully wei hed . lf t he work 1s of such nature that all 
ope.rat1ons .ere essentially interdependent ·upon other oper-
ati.omt, t here ia reasonable proximity between wo.rk tationa. 
and a community of interest in pertormanoe and product ia also 
p:vesent, t hen group 1ncent1 ve is preferred. Ac.tually much of 
t he work 1n industry can be performed most effectively where 
t hese conditions prevail . 
A group is ea·sentia.lly a pooling of output by two 
or more wor~e~a to determine performance. Both output and 
incentive earnings in.oreaae t hrough a eha1n-:react1ng interest 
in per:f'orman4e which affects all members of t he group . co-
operat1 ve effort tac111tates work for ·othor membe·rs of the 
group to the extent t hat within t he control of the group, pro-
duction is continuou&. Quality is also improved, for the 
attitude o~ dism1a.s1ng f"rom mind a un1t of production once it 
has completed its operational processing y an individual work• 
er 1a absent. Dependent upon the size of t he group which 
st rt wit h two operators nd has no absolute l1m1t, many un• 
•voidable delays can be sh i f ted from productive orkers to 
t he personnel appointed as group leaders... Group incant i ve 
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al o provides :ro1• g~Pr> t e11 nd -a ier cov rage lH.th stat dards.; 
f'or the r.t_not• elements of en opera tion may be s :bn ... lif rly 
g"t"ouped int o larger standard values. The objection t hat a 
_roup fails t o z•eward individual members in direct l'elat1on 
to i ndividual performa nce is d iscuaaed .in Chapter . Ili . Earn• 
ings rithin labor gr dGs are leveled. t hrough group incentive, 
and t he jealousies , ettused by hi . , earnings by some under in• 
dividual incentive sre misting .. Better control of the va:r1• 
oua grades of labor r .equ1red to complete operot.1ons is al•o 
po•s1ble. since proper group admin1atrat1on asa1gna 1orkera 
of varying akilla percentagew1se. And f1n&lly• t he relative• 
ly lo clerical co11t to lll&intain group incentive ia i mportant 
to nngement. 
4. Other Foaturea 
In add1 t1on to the des1:rabillty .of adapting a plan 
whi ch offers a def'1n1te 1ncent1va through va mrds i n direct 
r ela tion to production &bove the eats,bli.shed aver (fe, some 
other features re necessary to a aucce•sf ul incentive system. 
Bot l i n industries engaged 1n interstate commerce, and in 
.states with similiar legislation, 1 1n1mum wage la s seriously 
restrict the penalty provisions of some of the earlier wa e 
pl n•• They atill exist t o a limited degree, but t he lo ta•k 
rate must in all eases not f ll slow the minimum wage • re-
quired y la • ag plana, t hen, mu•t guarantee· le gal minimum 
hourly ratea. Uau lly t hese· guarantees will relato to t he 
going &Pea r ates Which la or has negotiated a baae r atea. In 
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t1ost _nstancee t ese base r tEh will be well e ove lee .1 mini-
mums .• 
Plans to be succenef' ll mu t al o 'be easily t nder-
stood, nd economic. 1 to a.dminister . If the s.tep necessary 
to ad just nomtnal waees to levels bove evera.ge pe.rform nee 
are numerous , 1. orkers b come unduly su pic1ous , nd mor l e will 
be dam ged . Pl ne . hould be equally understood by t he worker 
to whom the incentive is applied , and to the men gement ad .... 
m1n1ster1ne the details, The coste involved 1n a compl exity 
of ad justments to t he nominal .age moy out:reigh the savings 
occasioned y incentive payment. Th1s i particularly true 
if different formulas are a neceesery p rt of: the pl n. 
Good ork1ng condit :tona must a.l ·ao be capable of e-
. ng malntainec, ond mstnQee ent should provide corrections a.s 
t ecesn ry. TLo3e include a flow or materials or p~ rts in 
u fic1ent qunnt1ty to enable the :vorker to tt i n h is desired 
incent~ve, and t h e m 1nten nee .of machines in .f'1ret class con-
dition t o permit the utilization of meximu.m feeda and speeds . 
He t, 11 h t , and vent11 t!on are equally e sent1ol to inere aed 
production. If no immediate gu rantee on the maintenance of 
good working conditions re poesiblo; t1 na..,ement expence 
budget~ should be este 11ahed to permit temporary adjustment• 
of atond r:d: to deter-iora ted ork1n cond1t;1ons .• 
~.age 1nconti a lnnr. , then~ should meet the i'ollOW• 
1ng requi~ementa: 
a) apply where the task is measurable 
b) adaptable to gl'o.up incentive where teaaible 
c) contain a definite incentive proportionate 
with 1ncl'eased production 
d) guarantee an area minllilum W!l ge if' possible 
e) easily understood by all involved 
f) economical to administer 
g) working condi t1ons must be nuil1nta1ned 
E. W•t~t) Inc anti ve Plap.a In Popular Uae 
To attempt a detailed liat or the va:rioua plana aa 
they now exist woul.d require volumes of explanations. The list 
baa been growing yearly until the number of plans is well .bove 
requirement•. _,!any of: t he plans overlap others except for 
amall details to tit particular requirements. This. paper 18 
eon:f1ned to certain important pl ana, and to general cha:rac-
ter1st1cs or different plana. 
~ age incentive plans. 1n general contain one o.t' the 
following features : l) t he employee ;receives all of the gain 
in labor cost above base rate3 ; or 2} savings 1n labor costa 
are split in varying amounts 'between ~mployeea and employers. 
Beyond t h is t here .are the important considerations of the 
amount of incentive each plan offers, the level of its task~ 
whether or not standards must be established accurately, and 
the deg ree of 'lpplieaoility to group incentive application. 
Other characteristics include the complexity and coat of 
adminiatration, and the guarantee of minimum wage r·atea t .o at 
lea•t the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act or 
a1m1l1 r acta as adopted oy di tferent stotaC~~. 
It ia ful:'ther poasi...;le to classify wage 1ncenti ve 
plans into two ms1n types: l) plans appl ied to either indi-
vidual workers or groups; and 2) plans applied on a plant 
wide basis. There are other .financial incentives 'lh lch in-
elude profit sharing plena, quality onuses, foremen t .a bonuses, 
and t he like which m.ay be considered w1 thin the outer f ringe 
.of w ge incentive theory~ Since 1t is extremely doubtful 
whether incentives so far 1•emoved from the worker, and so de-
pendent upon t he a'o1l1ty 01 .. the company to show continuing 
protita , actually stimulate worker effort, t hese plans are 
not considered 1n. this paper . 
Mage incentive plan• of an individual worker_, or 
group nature, az•e generally in one o:e the following ca t e gories: 
1 .• ~tralp.)!t Piece ork 
. . 
Earnings rise directly 1n proportion with incre sed 
worker perfor mance above s t andard. Laoor costs remain can-
st nt , but reductions 1n overhead and f!.x&d charges result 
from graa.ter p.roducti vi ty. 
2. r.ra.sk and Step-up Bonus . Incent1 ve• 
Em.pl·oyee•s earnings 1ncrea.se at varying rates taster 
t han does individual productivity . Labor coats actually in• 
creaae, · then, as produ tion swi.ngs upward, but savings in 
total unit coats are possible t hrough a d1str1oution of £1xed 
charges .:>ver s larger num er .of production units. Piece rate• 
are stepped up when certain levels of' perfor ance are attained. 
3. Ttuk and Seale-do n Incentive Plane 
These plana are direct opposites ·of t hose listed 
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as Step•up ineentivea. Piece rates a:re low.,red aa production 
increases, and as s result both labor oosts and total unit 
costs are lowered., Savings in labor cost e-re s plit between 
t he worlcer and rJ.ana gemant once s-tandard pe:ri'orrmanee is passed . 
All of these plans reduce total unit costs 1£ the 
1noenti ve is present Gnd performance is tfbove standard.. They 
a-l s o permit increased earnings without siznil1al' increases in 
1 b or cos t s , a.n 1mportant consideration of many companies 
operating at near bre k·~ven points. If" the incentive 1a com• 
1ned with going area base wage rates,. it: 1e. n .eo.essary to ad-
just these ra tes only, in periods of economic e~pansion or 
con traction.. The perforrnanoe atandarda osn l'Wt1ain unoh an ed . 
Na otiat1ons on piece rates in other 1noant1ve arrangements 
will achieve t he same result during sim111ar periods, Stand• 
erde fo;r a.ny O.i. theae plans can be deter'IU1ned from t 1me atudie~ • 
empirical da'ta, ne·,.ot1at1ons, or any other mnnner f avorable 
to both management and t h$ union . 
Vlag~ ineenti ve plan of e plant-wide basis consider 
either physical units oi' output as do t he individual worker 
plans, or value of output. These plans at>e relatively few 1n 
number and usually 1nel ude all h ourly• paid w.o·rkers in a. 
company who ei t he:r prod·nce or servi ce .a product,. '!he chief 1 
and y far the most i mportant object1.on to t h eute plans is that 
t he incentive is so .far removed from t he worker t hat extra 
performance beosuse of t he inoentive 1s queat1onable . 
An an•lya1a of exiating age incentive plana in. 1948 
r eveoled the follmdno; :· 
-... 
nolys1s of Pr1nc1pal TtSaa ot 
Incentive Systems ,In Each · or 2~<Compttn1es {1) 
Type of 1neent1ve 
Individu l incentive systems 
Piece wo.rk 
T ylor d1frerent1al piece rate 
Halaey gain sharing plan 
Standard !Iou.r plan 
Point incentive w ge ayatema 
· od1f1ed. Bedaux 
Original BedQUX 
Dyer Plan 
Steven• Plan 
Norri · un1 t plan 
·laeellaneou• * 
Total 
Group incentive systems 
num.ber Of 
Companies 
96 
a· 
6 
37 
17 
4 
4 
• 3 
30 
2t5'3' 
56 
Per Cent 
48 
1 
3 
18 
a 
2 
2 
2 
1 
15 
ltRS"% 
* Include• plan• not identified in auff1o1ent 
detail to allow ol aa1f1oa t 1on. and plan• 
occurring with trequenoy or ·one. 
,;. 
The Standard Hour .Plan ie 1ncreaa1ng in popularity 
and is des t ined to expand t"urt h er in the year• ahead. Rather 
t han detail t he work.ing f'e turea of the many other pl an• in 
existence .• this plan has been selected for analya1a since it 
is expected to replace moat of the.ae· other plana in time. Full 
participation by the workers in the ••vinga reaulting f'rom pro-
duction a·bove standard ia one of the esaent1•l oharacteriatioa 
o:t t h e Standard Hour Plan, and 1t ia telt that t 
Thia may largely explain union w1111ngneaa 
t .o go a long wi t h t h ia type o1 .. plan, where 
the union 1& aat1af1ed that some form o:f 
(l) l!at1onal Industrial Conference Board, Inc • ., . a"e P rnent Syatenu~, Stud1ea in Personnel Pol1e1ea. No. 91, l§ia, page 12 
inc lnt1 v£ .. p"y1ne.nt is appropriate . An in-
creasing nwnoer of oomp8n1es have adopted 
St ndar~, Sour Plans i n recl3nt y~3~re . (l ) 
Performance atandarda are usually, though not ne.ceasaril.y, 
eat bliahed fl'o ti e tud1ee, and re expre sed ~.n standard 
houl'& . f...n 1 po1•tant ch.araetar1st1a .of the Pl n is that area 
wage 1 .. ~tes :furnis'l the found~tion upon which t he incenti've 1a 
basad. ~ .. 1.eae can be adjusted dul~ing v rying periods of' eeono• 
mic aonditions. 
It t he elapsed labor time required to perform the 
work is equal t o cr less than the llowed standard, the 
operator is paid for the allowed standard at b.1s basic wage 
rate . If mora elapsed lab or houra are re,quired than t h e ata.nd-
erd allowa, t he oper to.r is p id his basic hourly rate t ime• 
the number of hours worked . A a1mpl1.f1ed .formula oalculatea 
nominel egea: 
Before std .. is Jiitta1ned: Total Time x Hourly Wage Rate - Earn1nga 
.After std . ia attained: Std. Houra x HO'\Wly · ~.age Rate = Earn1nga 
Th1a Plan embodies ll of the dcs1:ra'ble featur.ea required of' 
an incentive pl.an a .a deta.iled in earlier pagea . 
summarz 
The preceding pa gea h ve outlined the purposes, 
eif'ecta. and fe .ctol~ .a favor . le to management throue')l wage in• 
centlve ayatezu , • gener 1 ooverag e ot var1out pl•n:s, and the 
objectives man gement •eeks in installing 1ncent1 ves·. The 
emphaaia has been on the outlook of mana •~ement. In the follow-
(l) Ibid. at page 10 
ing ch .ptera, a critical analy is by labol.' on the general 
su ject of wage 1ncen.tivea ia outlined:. 
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( .1 ) L. P. · 1to1~ 1md • 
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• 
d1 1l.lusioned orkers and promoted distrust of manage ~mt , 
genuine wage incentives ·1ere still unkno n . 1'he Halsey Plan 
which 'I fl introduced in 1891 at t he Canadian Rand Drill 
Comp ny met ith modera t e success, but only in specif ic in-
stances here estimated ra t es preva i led.. Gain-sharing and 
premium .and profi t-sharing pl~ns also existed in a limited 
number prior to this work by Ta-ylor, but their incentive value 
is questions· le since rate measurement was inaccurate, and t he 
incentive well-re oved fro:m t he wor ker. 
Taylor started h is experiments i n t he early 1 880'• 
in · 1dvale, and l ater at Bethlehem; but it was not until 1895 
t hat his first paper nA Piece-Rate System" was presented to 
t he Aln.er1can Society or Me chan1eal Engineers. Chief among 
h1a po1nta were that aceurate ra tes increased wages without 
1nereas1ng the coat of manufactured goods, eliminfl t ed the old 
motives ot' the worker to reduce et.fort and "soldier'• • and pro-
moted cooperation between the workers and management . H1• 
earlier pleas for the necessity oi.' measur ement of work were 
un ccepted, and even this paper ftHled to •rouse enthusiasm 
tor work mea sur ement . Anoth eP paper in 1903, "Shop l·~anagementtt, 
a1m1l1arly went neglected, and 1t was not until 1911 that 
Taylor made an indelible i mpres-sion. "The Principles of 
Sc1ent1:fic 1anagement" in 1911,. cal.led tor a complete mental 
revoluti on by both the workers and mana gement to discard t he 
old aiege which existed, and to coopera t e t or t h e betterment 
of both . carl B. 1Jarth$ the originator of t h e Barth Va riable 
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Shorl.ng Pl n• provided much of the direct i on needed by Taylor 
during t hi s e.xper1ment£ition and development o£ n new· bs sil!t 
F"r ank E. Gi l breth who developed and enc.owaged 
motion s tudy during t he period 1914-1918 w a another who help ... 
ed build a f'oundat!.on for better wage incen tive plans . ·eg1n-
ni ng with bricklayers and later expanding into indus try during 
, orld War I, he carried aome of' Taylor's ide a to rnore prec1ae 
conclusions. 
Commenting on theae years,. and t h ose which followed , 
E. s . Hnrning made an observation t het 
The outstanding devalop ent in wage in .. 
centivea during the past torty•five yeara 
luls not oeen t he particular wage incentive 
plans tha t were devised but the develop-
ment Qf tools to aid 1n the administration 
of sll sueh plana: tools suoh Qs time 
atudy, motion study, and t he technique of 
a.ppraiaing the w·orker' s pe;rformence. Hand 
i n hand 1 th this development ha.a ~;one the 
development of men •killed 1n t he use or 
t hese tools . (1) 
hether sc1.ent1tl c management had its beginning& in 
Taylor's ork, or in t he idees advanced by Henry R. Towne in 
1886 is irrelevant.. The i mportant conclus i on is t hat t he 
founda tion for better wage 1nce.nt1vas w s establ i shed 1n t his 
era. But t he period up to 1930 saw wide-spread abuse of t he 
principles ot job s t ndardiz t ion, a.nd the design and 1nstal-
l.at1on of numerous wage ince.nti ve plans. Ef fi ciency e.ll:perta 
(l) l'lat!onal Indus t rial Conference Board, Some Probl ems in 
~afe Administration, Studi es in Personnel Pollcles, No. 19, 
I§ 6, page 2 
and consulting engineers were \\tf3ll-scnttered throughout t he 
growing industri 1 economy, ond many of their method were 
a · dincredit to the profe·s sion. 
'rho advent of the Fi rat ~orld Wa r~ which just preceded ! .• r. Taylor's death in 1915, 
and the pressure f or increased production 
ores ted a demand for the aerv1 ces. of his 
associates e;reater than they could .meet . 
This over•demand £or the services ot 
tra 1ned quali fled men laid ·open the pro ... 
feasion of industrial engineering, ee it 
1s no known to t he untr ined oppor-
tunists, to ~eff1oienoy experts" w1th 
little 1r ny qu 11:f1cat1ons, ttnd to others 
whose prime purpose waa · o "cash 1n•• on 
this new proi'e.aa1on . Industry and 1n• 
"duatrial engineering wil~ e. :. long time 
recovering from the evils wrougnt during 
the year• 1915 to 1930, and they ha ve 
al:r•eady ps 1d a he vy pr1 ce. ( l) 
/ 
An overdemand for 1 ed1 te u e of 'l.'aylor' a principles, then, 
led to a misuse o£ these principlea, nd discredit to the pro• 
r sion . 
Durfng the great depression there wr.a a return to 
time payment y many .i ndustries with either insufficient pro-
duction to maintain incentive earnings, or immedia t e need to 
elim1n te overhead costs. Later in such hasvy industry as the 
automotive manufacturing field, the new strength of organized 
labor l.;rough.t about a mod1.f1cat1on of wag~ incentive payment . 
But the present use of wa ge incentives 1a increasing, and 
It might e said that, on the whole, we 
are no emerging from the dark ages in 
(1) J• K. Louden, Wase Incentives, 1944, page 2 
t he use o.f !ncenti ve pl ns na an. integral 
part of a aound industrial engineering 
prot) .t"t:U11. • e find ~-heir use bein advo-
c ted 'by government , nt1U1&gement, and 
labor. (l) 
· ·he relnt1onahip between 11 !lge incentives nd an 
application of t he principl es of job st ~ndard1z t.ion is im-
portant. It tuat be re:nembercd that Taylor 1n ''A P1ece-
te System" in 1895 pointed out that ccurate task measure-
ment would pe :mit higher wages without inc:re/aa!ng the coat ot 
t he good produced. ~ · 1hcre v orkor e.ffort is increased; and per• 
for.mance greater under an incentive than under a time pay ent 
plan, 1 . bOI' car1 d-emand a greater share of productivity value. 
This inc rea. sed . e!'forrnal1ce necesai totes smeller contribution 
of t he capital and l end foc t or·s" A mrt{ex· performing his task 
at 130 per cent .o£ ave:rs ge perform nee reduces the need for 
capit 1 by 30 per cent. Labor is ~aid , t hen$ a.ocord1rlg to a 
contribution to production which is greater 1n rela t ... on to t h e 
contributions o.f land and c.apit 1 th :n i po sible r,here wage 
incentive~ are not used. 
b .. The Growth and. • Strength of Unionism 
~ hile there was orua stu~tterod unionism prior to 
l 70, 1t · as not until t.h.e organization of the 1\nigb.ta of Labor 
t hst ef!'eot.ive wide·-spread ction by labor 'i e po sible. The 
e rlier 1~ ticmal L · or Union in pressing demands tor an eight 
hour ,ork day m de an impression; ·but t he union itself quickly 
faded into labor history. 
(l) Ibid. at page 9 
T. .J.a existence of the Kn1.ght w~s the first c;ood 
t~:x. mple o sol i::l~rit::r or t h e worki ng clP.se in th1s country . 
Just prior to ltg formation, t here waa tremendous activity in 
industry tid t he railroads which made union! m nece• ... ary. Thia 
eaJ:'lier duende lt!o new .~ tremendous 1ncrefinle in small private 
ownership and control, tl t h 1ndustri .1 employment r · pidly 
becoming impersonal ,. Land frontiers H~re test closing , and 
t h e people could tlot go beck to the J.a nd ln. nurn · era . - u ch ot 
t h G succesa of the I'\nighta wa:~ because of ita poliey of admit• 
ting all workers, and al o from winning a aeries o.f. remarkable 
tr:l.ke • Xts ... a:t ula wtu: tl" gic, end a big step baekw&rd ror 
labor. Ch!e ... a rn on"? the rassor:.s osus1nf:;. its !.'eiltl!'e were the 
oonfl1 ts o.f' t he Kl.-:d[")l.ts 1 th skilled vwrkers in trade unions . 
fo l l ur t; o w· :n s l;r~. l.::~.HI .ftar 1886 • and ntrong cpp · e 1 ti on from 
without . 
The for.mai~ion of the · Gr1ean Federatlon o.f L ·bor 
in 1 886 WlHJ at about t he s•mG period when T ylor w e conducting 
his very early a~;por'..n1ent 3 in the pl'1no1plee of' sc1ent1f1e 
mana gE) ent . The F' .de:r•at:lon !'! y h :ve est1mR ted thG pote ntial a 
of' an appl~~cntion o ' theae pr1no1ple~ eorly, for it pledged 
its-el.f to atrict trade autonomy and the pr<tcepts of bus1neas 
unioniam. Its growt h came in spurts dur1ne; t h :i.R· ea:rly period, 
baing 8low to 1897, r p1d to 1904 , utoble to 1910, nd very 
rapid t h ro .gb. "'iorld War I yeare 1 largely bee u.~e of e-overnment 
encouragement., 
1rhe Industrial Work13rs of t .he f orld beg-.m in 1 893 
d"t.l.ring tho er.rly d y of t he Al!l.erioan. li''eder t ion of l .!& bor 
pl'O'Ted an a ff'ect i ve t)rpo of in.duatr,.al union f or 9. t>rie.f 
p~:.t:·i(}( • It O:t>cif.ll'1i. Zed casu-· 1 labor in t h e West and scAt tered 
d :tsguatod group. i n tr.e Ea st to a clAhned · e ll\k membership of 
1,500,000. H.n n trade un1.on, the I .-w.m. co11 .peed to skeleton 
propol .. t:t on f or severAl re~.,ons , ll of them trsceable· t ·o ita 
philosophy o.f n.11.1 tant j o:; acti on , snd revolution of the work• 
t t .11n po~.nt it :ts . ol.l to point out th~t t he growth 
in org .n1zed lobor ;;ns nm'tch:lnr. t!l.e e:x.psns:!on and u e of scien-
r p· ly . 
Tot 
... 
year :::nem'be r sh ip yea r member hip 
189'7 447 ,ooo 1901 1,124)700 
1 698 500,700 1902 1,375"900 
1899 611,000 1903 1,913,900 
l900 866,500 1.904 2,072,700 
1905 2,022,300 l909 2.047,400 
1906 1,958 ,700 1910 2,.184,200 
1907 2,122,000 l9ll 2,382,800 
1908 2,1:30,600 
.his oontlnued growth w·as h ... n om:tn. 1 a·fter 1900 1 for thare • 
tt1tt ~u·' cwpl o;r r oppos1t1.cn to organized 1 b or durin , this 
period . ' .e :r t:lor..al A soeilltion of MAntlf'aeturer!!, for in-
n sr.ce , put or. r ~-~t n:.: _v-e f :;ht forth .. open sho . ~ riting 
on the c routh c f 1. b r tn th.J. :1 perlod, Prof(HH:tor Pe rlman 
(l) Leo Wolman, The Growth or .American Trade Unions, 1880-~92'3, 
1924, page 33 
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presented the following concluaion: 
To the .American l abor rnovement the conquest 
of the right to exist wa ever ita para• 
mount problem •••••.••••••• American employers 
were steeled i n their opposition to union-
ism and at t he same time ena.bled to .made 
t hat opposition effective by the e::traord1-
nary strength of the inatitution _of private 
property in a country which was occupied 
and settled by laboring pion~ers, ere ting 
property t or themselves. as t hey went slong 
and holding it in small parcels. For, 
unionism however con!lervative its objectives, 
is still a campaign against t he a baolute 
rights 01. the pri vate property of t h$ 
employer. (l) 
Despite th1 opposition, great gains in membership were m de 
by labor until ove;rr 5,0001 000 members were enrolled in all 
unions by 1920. Of courae the war period was contributory 
cause to this expansion. The decline in mem.oerahlpa in t he 
next t hirteen yeara is difficult to explain; since unprece-
dented industrial expansion as under way. It JllUSt e 
attri uted largely to inertia. by older unions :h1ch retained 
old tr de union atrticturea. 
From 1933 to the present date an entirely d1 f'ferent 
pattern o:f unionism has· been present. Combined membersh ip• 
have risen upward to approximately 15,000,000, and leg1al ·t.1on 
is in force entirely different from preceding lawa which often 
dec1s1oned against labor. The 1ntroducti·on of mass production 
into t he automotive, steel, electrical manufacturing ·nd like 
industries presented labor with an opportunity to organize 
(l) Selig Pearlman and Philip Taft, H1atory of Labor in the 
United St tea, 1896•1932, page 621 
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hich has been largely ful filled. The entrance of the 
government into the labor-management rel.stions field haa 
worked to t he benefit of labor, i f not to increase ita m1l1• 
t ncy . Such chan (•ea in the labor pattern alao resulted f'rom 
changes in t r a de union struct ut•e. The American l"oderat1on or 
Labor which domi na ted t he acene prior to 1935 now share• the 
pilot position wi t h t he Congress of Industrial Organiz tiona. 
Industrial unions. a nec.eu1sity dur.ing t his period of exp nd• 
1ng industry, h ve come into universal uae, althaugh. the 
A ,. .{4"~ .L. till adheres t o baaio craft pr1nc1pl'SS in some inet nee a. 
Unionism has kept pace with t he growing economy, and 
1a be glnning to use 1 ts s t :r•ength on wage incentive 18suea. 
Collective bar gaining has entered tne field of.' 1neent1vea. and 
an e.xp nsi on ot t his entrance will fo.llovr. 11a:ny union , ae 
ahown in later chapters, presen.tly require t hat collective 
o r gaining be a part of wa ge 1neent1ve administration. 
c. A l~ator:1eal Outline .ot Opinion• 
Throughout these growing pains of a greater use ot 
wa a 1ncen t1 ve pl ena.. and -extended c.overa.ge Qf labor .. y union 
le dersh1p , t he general att itude of la,bor toward wage i ncen .. 
t1ves was not condusive to good sc1ent1f1c management princi-
ples. The n1ental revolution of labor toward a n a:ccepta,nce ot 
t hese principles was slow. In the light of what transpired 
in industry following initia~ acceptance of Taylor•• princi-
ples, it woul.d be unfair to expect labor to b.ave felt other• 
wise. Objections to wage incentives arose out of t he abuaea 
to labor y unscrupulous employer& .• 
This consisted in educing the rate when-
ever production was incl .. · sed o t hat tl G 
worke~s ·ero producing a great deal more 
1thout proportlon t ely increa sing earn-
ings. (l) 
The e.ftic1ency experts and f ollowers of Taylor, g2•eatly 1n• 
creasing in number 1th each ye~r, did not adhere to the cle r 
objectives he had outlined . Ins t ead they 
Often c rriad hi s pri nciple to inh.Ul'!lan 
extremes, expecting the sar.1e routine 
effi ciency from a man as from a machinE~ . 
Rumen beings, afte.r all. cannot be 
e.ffect1vely reduced to tha s1:tpleat re .. 
pet1t1ve motions, and t he &ttem.pt by 
efficiency exports to do so aroused the 
bi tter antagonism of the labor move-
ment. (2) 
Early negat1'1te attitude• toward wage 1ncont1vea alao 
concerned the human elem~nt of t he worker . The fear that t he 
workers were to develop into aem1•automatic attachment to 
machine• or rigid and inflexible forma of directing production 
1£ motion enalya1a and time study pol1c1ea wero pursued by 
mana.gementa waa real. Speed .. up• with all the harah oonaequeneea 
to the worker were envisioned., 
o practiell man acquainted with the 
methods of pxooduction Qnd the influences 
which emanate t'rom the management of a 
corporation through the auperintendant, 
foreman, and a~b-fOhl!11ln to the workmen, 
to stimulate their productivity,. will. 
;;fail to realize that, ·.qven though the 
(1) Vl illiam s. Uopkins,. Labor in the American Econo&, 1948• 
p go 130 
(2) Ibid. at pages 58· 59 
· .ystem o sc1ent-1f1c management t'.ri th its 
t1 e studies, ita pree1sa f'o:rm of organ-
iz . -tlcn, d 1ts pre .1um.s snd onuse:s 
to workmen nd .foremen for qu ntity in 
reduction, as est liahed 1n $ny pl nt 
OY' the best t~ained and O$t just e:X• 
p rts and vlth. a ;;rop r csr~ that no ork• 
man woul d e drlv~n to speedy physic l 
exhaustion,. 1t mu t soon de&ener _ t~ into 
a aystexn unde~ which each ~Norkman would 
· e forced to labor to the phys!eal break-
ing point or drop out to tlHake room tor 
others h ose . v1 tality had not y. .t bean 
exhausted. (l) 
That labor was concerned by what appeliu:•ed a di sregard for t h e 
hun'.an factor by ac1ent1f1o management 1a apparent f rom the 
above. The intelligent application of allowances for rest to 
overcome i'at1gue; and personal requirements of the worker, was 
still in the futur-e. 
The publication by the ~1lwaukee Federation of Labor 
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in 1914 of a d1acu•sion by F . t . Taylor repx-eaenting ac.1ent1.f'1c 
management, and • P .. Alif'as representing the Ma.tal Tradea 
Department o .... the A:meric n F'ederat1on of' Ln:Poxr also cle rly 
demonatra tea the early opposition by labor t o wnge incentive•. (2) 
The science of t i me study wtul still now at this time, and lsrgely 
unrefined according to pre.aent tandsrds. After Taylor had 
outlined h1a principles of ac1ent1f1c management a.nd the po-
tential• poss·1ble t hrough adherence to thooo prinec1plea. 
Ali faa reul.4ttad. F!l"O t condemning the bnaic poin.t of using 
(l)John P. Frey, The Re1-st1-onuh1J of ._..cicn:•"' 1f1~ Uan~c;auant to 
La or, an address printed in Th~ Amer1c~n Fed.eration1st, April. 
191~, pages 298·299 ·· · 
(2) John R. Commona, Trade Un1on1•m and Labor Problems, 1921, 
Chapter XI 
a.n :tncent iva to 1n c l"easo wo.~.~ ·:er prodll,ctivity, he later ttsoked 
time study. U!a re:;:~9onint.; illl "' aurpr.~s ingly fr nk.: 
Souo p ople ·my wond r why ·ua uhould ob"" ject to tima ntudy. In the first place 
it is hum.~.l,. ot.1nu f.or & rn. to be ~lUtJ• 
peeted or soldiering and loafing . o e 
wn • to old a stop '7a i; c . c.m h ir.t so 
that he doosn't cheat. That's not t ho 
principal o ject1on. t'he o ecti·on is 
t hat in the paat one of the meana :by 
i'fhich. an el:lployee ha s been a le to keep 
hie head above w ter and prevent oe1ng 
oppr ased y the e pl oyel" has been that 
t he employer didn't know juat exactly 
;1 at the employe·o eould do . The only 
way that the workman has been able to re-
tain time enough :tn which to do tho work 
with the speedwith :h1eh he thinks he 
o ""ht t~ do 1t, h a een to keep the om-
ployer somewhat in ignorance or exactly 
t 10 time needed , r.rhe eople of the United 
States ha.ve a right to •ey we want. to work 
only so fa3t. We don•t wnt o work a 
t st as we are able to. ·e w•nt to work 
a .r.. ast as 'VVe th1nk 1 t comfortable for us 
to ork. We haven' t corae into existence 
for the purpoo3 of.' seeing how great (l t3ak 
we can perf'orm through lif . time, 1e are 
trying to regulate the worlc ao aa to make 
1t n s.u.x111 ·ry to our 11veS' ·nd b e r:me-
f1ted thereby .• 
oat people w l,r to Mork 1n t he morning, 
1f it isn't oo far . It' .cmebody ahould 
d :t ...  cover thst t hey could rut! to work in 
one third the t1me.1 they might b.ave no 
ooj ct1on to have that fact ance!'ta nad,. 
but if t e. man who cert 1ned it h ·d the 
power to . ke them run, they mi e,ht o·bject 
·.o h v1ns him ~:tnd :tt out . (1) 
In t . e s::nne di cussion, Alifns made ):rie£ mention of 
the Qbse.noe of a place 1n ae1entific management as developed 
by Taylor for- collective bargaining. He passed over this 
(l) Ibid . at pages 148•149 
lightly but i t indicated the beg1nn1nga of: at tention to this 
proolem oy org nized l or. A seen in later Chapters, union 
today insist upon collective bargaining before they accept 
wage incentives. 
Early opposition to wage 1ntHmt1 v-es, then , was on 
two ch 1e.f 1aa.ues: 1} a disl ike of so1ent1f1c mana ge ent aa an 
encroachment upon 1 orta right. to generally determine ita 
own pace; and 2) the ·a uses to labor hich r sulted from an 
over-.-bundanoe of 1nc.ent1ve plans end management enrr1neera 1n 
tha thirty years following reco. n!tion of Taylor•a orka. But 
there were some uni ons which favored piece wol'k 1n these early 
yeazsa as was determined by Proteaaor -1cC•be (1) in 1908 from 
a study of organized labor and piece work. Of' the 117 union• 
he solicited, 58 were on a time worked 'basi•, 33 •ccepted piece 
work, and 26 opposed it. Professor Sl1chter in 1941, after 
concluding his. own study on this same matter commented aa 
tollowa: 
The att1tudea of. individual unions toward 
piecework nd timework have undergone 
littl~ change since oCa e made h1a atudy 
in 1908. {2} 
'l'he whole matter , t hon, of whether to a ccept wa ge 
1ncent1 ves instead of time psyr.nent has marked much of the 
tradition sur~ounding un1on ... menage ent contro'Ver y .. At aome 
period in their experience, most t .::r de unions have opposed 
(l) D. A. f,~cOabe, ~he Standard Rate In Ame~ican ~rade Uni on•, 
1912 
(2) Sumner H. Slichte~ , Union Policies and Industrial -anasement, 
1 941, page 309 · · 
nage incentive payment . Thi s erose .out . of the introduction 
of complex and imf 1r incentive pl nns1 and t he grovrth and m1s-.. 
use of' t he principles of cientif'ic anagement ,. J.Jut the trend 
· 1.s n o 1 being reversed as e z•esul t or' the grovring strengt h of 
.organized l bor . until today~ 
There i• wider acceptance of t he view t hat 
worker• may be protected adequately by 
genuine collective bargaining and t ha t 
under this protection incentive .f'orma ot 
payment can provide secure incomes nd c n 
even help to ma intain the high. wage stand• 
ards demanded by American workers.,. .(1) 
z. Clark D1ck1neon noted the initial turning point 
from absolute oppoa1tion , to at ~east port! 1 the.oret1cnl 
acceptance of w•ge 1neent1vea 11 when he quoted a trneclaration" 
of t he Al:Q.erican F1ederat1on of Labor in 193'7 .at ita annual 
meeting : 
The Ame::-icsn Federation or Labor 1a the 
first organization of Labor 1n t he world 
to realize the i mportance or t he r etor 
productivity 1n economic aoeiety. lt no 
longer strives merely tor· h1ghe~ money 
wagea; 1t no longer str1ve.s me~>ely for 
h i gher· relill wagcu J it ·ltr>1ves for h i gher 
aociel w.a gea • .fo.r wagea which inc.reaao a 
measured by prices and produet!vity .. . (2) 
Current opinions by labor' on wage 1noentive•• both 
neg t i ve 'md in tho a.f!'1r.mat1ve. will be found 1n t he :t·o~low1ng 
chapters. 
(1} Van Duaen Kennedy* Union Policy and Incentive W ~e ·. ethoda .. 
1945, page 50 
(2) z. Ol•rk Dick1naon, Compenaating Induatr1el Ettort, 1937, 
page 6S 
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Chapter III 
Union Rejection and •egative Attitudea 
A. Pr1m -ry Reasons F·'or Opposition 
It is doubtful if a oopletely det iled listing of 
lauor•s reasons for rejecting age ineentives is possible . 
The bulk of disagreement 1a 1n tbe local where particul r 
proolema arise, and not usually at the international level 
as pointed out in the following ch pter. Frequently the e 
rejections are of minor consequence since they concern but 
fe workers in relation to t he entire labor movement . There 
are, ho ever , cart in basic reasons for labor's opposition 
to wage incentives. 
Lytle (l) believes some labor leaders favor t he 
a olishment of all :r ge incentive plana for the following 
reasons: l)• the Lump of Labor Theory with i ta opposition to 
efficient production; 2) the .fear thet leas efficient orkers 
ill be e r ssed; 3} high incentive earnings by good ork-
ers incre se the individuality of t hese mem ers away from 
union dependence; and 4) compl int and intercession, the life ... 
lood of union, ·lessens under ell-managed age incent1 vea. 
S11chter ta_kes a somewhat different view of 1a or's 
opposition to piece work : 
Just as the unions h ich pra:fer pi ece 
wo.rk or cc.ept it willingly are influ-
enced 1n the main · y t he bargaining ad-
vantages it gives t hem, so the unions 
(1) Charlea • Lytle , Wage Incentive !ethods, 1942, page 63 
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hich oppose p.iece work are inf'luenced 
la r gely by ba :r•ga1n1ng eonsiderat1ons . 
Unions are t a bargaining disadv ntage 
under piece work hen l) the unit or 
performance 1s d1f'f1cu.lt to define or 
to measure; 2) when operations in vari• 
ous' shops &'re vet1Y different ~nd when 
ne operations are numerous and not 
closely ccmparable 1ith the old ones; 
or 3) when it is difficult to compel 
the employer to ma!ntain standard ork -
:!ng conditione . When these disadvantage• 
r o marked, t he union 1·8 likely to op-
pose piecework. (l) 
Here,. t hen, . are t wo d1ve:vgent pointe of view, one 
largely payoh ologie•l, .and t he other more direct . Unions in 
general accept wa O'e i ncentives whe.n the operation of the plan 
1s sub ject to collective bargaining . Variations or complex-
ities which bring a out any o:f the situati ons auoh as Sl1chter 
mention• tend to steal the play away from t he union on such 
basic matters sa piece work ratea. Incent1 ·a plans , then. 
under cond1t1ona wb1cb pl'OV·& unau1t ble to 'bilateral adm1n1a• 
tration by both labor and management .meet w1 th the oppoait.ion 
ot labor. Variances in earnings in et. job order. ahop caused 
by the pr1c1ng of changing apparatus are caae in point . 
. . 
Not or,ay does worker re~ction to t he incentive increase at 
low periods of ea:rn1ngs~ but collective bargaining on wages 
may also break down. 
The early almses or wa ge 1neent1 ve pl na are still 
rem.em ered y many i n labor . Sear s often leave reminders 
hich are not erased easily~ and so it 1s that t he early usea 
(l) Sumner H. Sl1chter6 Union Policies and Industrial anase-~, 1942, page 296 
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and .. 1n1 tr t1 n 0 1ne nt1 l . 1.' c ll o-
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r 
• 
or ~J n t ho cUd fa or l 1 pr • ions- . 
O.d t• in u 
..... __.;.--
t v 1 t tl "1 \, 0 
ro ! t (U, or fr · 1c l 'ih1 oceur d 1n 
uc t • t 
st 11 h ·tu 1 1. 1n-
dus r1e l 0 r1e l nu in ,. t 1 d. 
ru r 1 tr1 lon. ,. Until t e 
1ndust er t d r . pr ent d r 
t not AU oc to v no proe ur • 1 -
e~ 1t 0 t1 tu t rd·, coul not Q,UG on d , n 
t his ' built gro ing resentment 1hich helped f"oster a 1•a tth 
of labor org niza t ion nd r te corrections in t he late 30'o. 
A mor•e detailed analysis of time study practices follows in 
later pages. 
Earlier uses or age incentive plans also included 
ra t e cutting and speeding-up to better 
in 'the competitive field. 
company's posi tion 
Very l1kel , i n t he interest .of labor 
costs in co pet1t1ve industry or in the 
inter -at of more profit , mana gement ha s 
·widely engaged 1n p:J"~ce•:rate cmtt1ng. 
and., \Yhile indue in . mo~·e apeed nnd . 
greater output, has attempted to 11nt1t 
earnings to little more than on ·daywork . 
It would scarcely. exaggerate . the· 1m.• 
portance of t his as a factor to say 
that 1t has been t he cause of causes 
of opposi t1on to piece ork in American 
indus t ry, appearing long in advance ot 
union organization. (1) 
Several of t he rerrt&ining factors h1ch were former-
l y important oa s1e rea ens for labor's unfavora le reaction 
to wage 1ncent1vos have ·b en redu<?ed, 1.f not ·ent i rely elimi-
nated. Iilavor1t1sm in assigning jo a o seasoned earning 
quality h s een well dissipated both by t he 1 r ger use or 
groups 43 a 1neth od of incentive det$r•min t i on, and y mo.re 
firmly entrenched unions . Groups reduce t h . possibility ot 
singling out t'ovored or ers since t he incentive earning• 
of the ork r depend on total grou~ performance. Unions re.-
al1ze, too, t .tat favor1tis promotes jealousies and troubl .e 
(l) H, A. lllis and R. E. ontgomery, Or sanizedLabor , 
Volume III , 1945, pa ge 399 
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1 ..... h 1n t he l"anka , nd is 1~ore insistent for t he impa:~:tial dis-
patching of jobs . 0 jecticns tnat ws 0 e incent1 ves caztry spe- . 
cialization to the point of cra f t detriment la also outdated 
although 1 t r, s a strong poin·t in t he past . T ..... e current in• 
elusion in t he Int ernational As sociation ot ,!ach1nists ot in• 
dustrial type locals is Gn excellent exampl of t he trend. 
While i t s cons titution contains a provis i on $Ds1nst t he ac-
ceptance of' piece ork in shops previousl y on a time worked 
as1s, such practi ce is not folloVIed . The old attachment to 
et·llf't linea remah'ls, ·uut the t rend is othervli ee, a.nd t h is pro-
vis;1on in the constitution is frequently overlooked. 
B. Current Opinions ReJecttna Incent1vea 
Occas1onally claims are made t hat w ge incentive• 
shorten the working li:fe of union members or that piece ratea 
incr ease t he b. zards o . .f' employ ... ent . ':::his is true of the ·eat 
Coast logging industry in the U if;ied: States . Durine; the war 
there was an attempt in t .tie indust r-y to i ns t a11 e group system 
whereby al.l 8JnPloyees in en opern tion would shvre 1n any pro-
. ' duction above the normal. mhe employers were um71lling to 
u e gro.up incentive but d1d desire to put more individuals 
on s piece work basis.. · ecaus& of t he physical t hreat to the 
individual through piece work , this waa rejected: 
Iuch of the .felling and bucking of t im er 
is done on a pieee ... work basis. ' ile 
many of the wovkers e1uployed on such work 
ake hat would be considered good wages, 
we feel t hat ·ecause t he work is atrenu• 
ous , in the f'1 rat pla oe, 1 t takes year.a 
oft of a lnan's productive life, and 
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.econdly1 i t is extremely haz rdous . 
Aa you may, or ma . n.ot kno'l , West 
Coast logging .has the highest fatality 
rate of any industry in the united 
States,. (l) 
Others reject w ge incentives because tle work of 
their mernbel•ships 1a not the type readi l y , ·daptable t ·o in-
oentive pplics ~ lon. Even conus plans e:re excluded. ihe 
Into :national' Typographical Union 1th 92 1 000 members reject.s. 
age incentives oecause of its p st experience i'l1th them . 
All of 1 ts me · ~n·s a;r.;.. currently or king on time bosis . 
The :ror1 perfol'l!led by memuere or 'l'he 
International '.cypographical Union is 
not uu1taole to piece O+' ·oonus pay . (2} 
The I.T.u. a ended 1ts constitution ln 1958 to proh1~;>1t locAl 
unions fro ro ... e1in existing pieC!e or bonus scal-a beyond 
January l, 1941. The earlier introduction or the linotype 
machine m. de tho estimation ot"' output difficult . Shortly 
sf'ter 1 ts 1ntro< uctlon · the locals of• ·the I.r.r • u. were advised 
by the internation l to :seek time scales for the meohlnas 1n 
pla·ce of piece work . 
The Ind:ustri&l orkers: of the Wor l d is 
definitely opp osed to incentive payment 
plans . ~ve cons1d r· the .function of 
lsoor union to· e the decrease 1n e:x ... 
ploitstion, and thot the one purpose of 
incentive plans has. been to increase 
that exploitation of labor. (3 ) 
(l) Virg il. Burtz , Direc tor of Research and Education, Inter• 
national ood·torkers of . me1•ica , CIO, direct mail reply, l949 
(2.) EJ.met• ·,ro 111 Vice President ,. Intern tional ?ypograph1csl 
Union, direct ail reply, 1949 
{3) !' .. red Thompson, Education and Research Direct or , Inter-
national ' orke~s of the ~ orld, d irect ma il reply, 1949· 
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Consideiing the conditions out of which t he I. • • as organ• 
1zed, such a philoso hy in t e infancy or the Union is under-
stands le. Ita pl n tor anarch osyndic lism arose fro t he 
unrestricted c 1tal1a of ita era where la or wa s orthleaa 
and casu 1, especially in t he mine s . To cling to t he idea 
of explo1.t at1on in this dvnnced period of labor rela t ions 
is pol1 tical. By t heir very purposes a expla,1ned i n earlier 
pages e realize t hat incent ive - plana have more vbJectiv~ 
purposes than the e.plo1tat1on of l abor . 
no t h in 
he f e r o some unions t ha t - age incentives are 
ut speed~up systems is l ao h rd to .understand. 
The Internation 1 rother hood of .Bookbinders 
is opp sed t any incentiv pl n3 suah a 
piece work , t he Beds~ system, or other 
speed- up syste s . {1) 
ut 11 speed- ups a e I ot t h. result or age incentives . Im ... 
prove ent in orker mo ale i n time p- yment pl nt caused by 
a y o:f savor 1 re ons will be retiected t hrough h igher pro-
duct i on . Increased produc tion 1n such ca s s 1s & form ot 
sp ed- u if t e same tools, ~te:rio l s , an methods are em ... 
ployed . Certainly t l e unim would :t condone increased in-
stU' ce covera 0 e f r it omployecs :f t h e rtployer f inanced 
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t he venture , or good1 :tll u,.lt in other taya not to the impair-
ent o the m i on. . stsnd gcin• t \'a ge incentives , then, 
!'o fenr of' spe · d- ups 1 s stu oorn nd u.nr S'-m l e . 
Solomon · ::trk1n, eoe r ch Director for t e 'l'ext1le 
(1} .1a el H r i s, Secretary, for t h e President, Internati ona l. 
orot erhood of ook ders, d1reet mail reply , 1949 
·orkers Union ot .Amer1c• criticizes current wage 1noentive 
plans in the paper Labor• s Attitude Toward Vage Incentive 
Pl ns." (l) He elaims wide-spread suspicion of wage in~ 
cent!ve plans in the ranks of labor . 
Stal~ting with any incentive pl an as a means of re-
ward for add1ttona.l eft"o:J:"t~ he counters with t he worker' .s 
expectation of a l i ving wa ge &$ a normal b;y-produot of. em-
ployment. In industries with sub-standard wa ge levels, t hen,. 
workers are disinterested in w ge. incentives, More enlighten-
ed orker's'• however, work.ing in higher- wage industries accept 
t he principle oi" h:!gher ·1.ncomes .from the increased individual 
contribution of labor . 
Barkin condemna the restriction of' the types of 
productivity chan es for h1ch the worker is currc:mtly com-
pensated. Rewards resulting solely from productivity in-
creases due to human application inspire labor discontent. 
The current methods of distributing the benefi t -s of increased 
productivity are unfair to labor. Negot1at1·ona on rates_ in• 
stead of un11 teral time study s tandard s would d1str1oute 
saving s as measured by an incent i ve system more equitably. 
Against individual incentive which d1f'1'e r ent1atea 
among workers and set s them .. aga1nst each other h e cites t h e 
de s ire f'or_ security. Unio.na refuse to budge on standard j ot 
ratea., or t he 1ns1atence upon grou_t, rule aa a means of' pro-
(l) Industrial and La.bor Relations Review,.. Volume: 1, No. 4,.. 
July 1948 
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venting dlscr1m1nat1on . The protecti .e practice of t he 
st nd · rd le.trel of production is also used to . t ta1 n group 
seeur1 ty y workers . 'lhy , t h en,. should la or tolerate in-
cent ves used on n indl vi.dusl wor.xrAr basis? Proreasor 
D. A. l1 c.Cabe concurs in this reasoning from · ·n early study 
on labor ' s attitude to. ard pioee ork: 
In genoral, the sentiment or~ ........ . 
a gainst a r w men receiving more than 
the others on the job simply on account 
or greater speed . (1) 
Barkin does eontiJ'tll,. however , that the various goals of high -
er productivity, group security, and the pri nciples of wage 
incentive syatema can be reconciled t h rough the 1nstal.lat1on 
or group wa ge incentive progr•m.s. 
An · ddi t1onal complaint a gainllt wa ge ineentive pl n s 
1s t he reduc.t1on 1n personnel or the el .1m1nat1on or s k ills 
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t h rou time and motion studies. Pas.t uni'avox>eble experiences, 
rate cutting, and the mysteries and complications of dl.fferent 
systems are lso mentioned 1n thi.s paper . Barkin's conclusion 
1e part1eul rly well stated: 
Organized la or 1 s experience with •a e 
incentive sys.tems provides a vast body 
of critical conclusions necessary to the 
sueeessrul reconstruction of these plans ; 
together 1th the findings of the pey-
c ologists and soc i al and 1ndu.str1al in• 
vestigatora, they auggeat that theae pro-
gra 'l& need consider ble re•evaluat!on 
and redesigning. Present plans are in-
ere.as.1ngly becoming sources of controver• 
sy and barriers to rising productivity. 
(1) D. A.. cGaoe , The Standard Rate In American Tra.de Unions, 
1912, page 108 · 
Instead of prom.ot!n0 labor- u:ma gement 
co-operation, they have become sources 
of. industrial conflict. 
Or g n1zed labor 1a intet--ested in h i e.h• 
er output nd income . Its active co-
operation c~n be enlisted in progz•ams 
tor promoting productivity t hrough di-
rect lift oc1at1on of .r ni n :;.s i t h out-
put,. ut such plans must provide .for 
t he sharing of t he gains in productiv• 
ity ar1a1ng not only from increases in 
human application above high task l ev-
els , but also from all oth &r sources 
ot gre ter productivity . The per~onal 
eoats of such prograll18 must e consider-
ed in t.aah1on1ng these plana; they ust 
be kept at a minimum. Hi gh produativ-
lty ·sh ould not be p$rverted by reatriot-
1 ve ma n ger.i l polleles .• VI tal to t h e 
success or such progra s are the re-
duetlon .and a1mpl1t'1cat1on ot the nu- . 
meroua technical probl ems which now en-
denger eo-operative 1 · or-msnegement 
relatione . The present me surements 
used to . rr1ve at s tar~ards tor wage 
!!letting lack se1enti.f1c found t ion and 
must be used with the caution required 
by all common-sense or practl c·al tech-
niques. To reat entire ayatema of .nge 
payment upon t hem is to abuse t he tech-
nique and d o injustice to t he people. 
Sucoeaa.f'ul programs demand t he joint 
fashioning of the technique by both 
trade unions nd management. (l) 
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The i mportan t International Union of t he United 
Automobile. Aircraf t, .Agricultural Implement Forkers of America 
has also t hrown 1 ts weight a.gainst wa ge inoentl ves . It presento-
ly has approximately twenty- five p<~r cent or its members under 
some kind o.f 1ncent :tve nystem. 
(1) Solomon l3arkfn, Labor's Attitude Toward ~ age Incentive 
Plans ; Industrial and Labor Relations . eview, Vol. 1, o. 4. 
July 1948, page 572 
· e have had a ver•y Unbeppy experience 
-w1t4 wage incentive$, and ar~ attempt"" 
ing to get these- people out from the 
incentive system s rapidly as we can • 
.~ ·~turall;)" ; ;o l''e opposed to this 
syatem. (l) 
ut t he u .. A.l . _ ... c.I.o. i _s not as opposed to wage 
incentives as it is to time study as :a technique to devel.op 
these incentives . 
lVhera auto o:rker·s first come ou - from 
ehind their machines. to organ:tze the 
UAW ln 1936 and 193'7, I PEnne111 a~ wt:,t 
uaod our new stren,th to ·make a contri-
but ion to Time otudy principles . 
Speedup nd U..'1fa1r production rates were 
aa much the eauso of our ang-er aga1na.t 
the tyrnnny in the pl .nt s any or -the 
other cruelties which led us. to organ-
ize . 
In plant s lilts Kelsey J-JayGs _ nd .Eriggs, 
when we finally put our union ·outtona 
on, one of our t::ll•.st act wa s to te.lJ. 
mana.gera.ent that production rates had 
to .oe. eh&ng d• snd th•t "lfHJ all ther$ 
was to it. 
lt"ls:tlnctivoly ~e realized. 'th$t tlme 
study had een the excuse tor ar·o1-
t:t".arlly t kin3 dva.nt.sge of u • T1me 
study then waa th~ opinion of a power-
ful man& -:·emerJ.t dealing w1 t 'l unor ar.:d.zed 
workers. In the first days o:f our or-
gan1?.ation we seized the r1 r:;;ht to have 
opinions of our own. 
Employ rs we:J~G outl'aged,. but what or-
fQ.{.ded t .401u w _ 4'l that tor a ch ·nbe the 
op1n1on on time study that prevailQd 
w s t:_at cif the men in t;Le &hop . 
(l) Lewis Qsrl1ner, ~~anag1ng Editor of Ammunition• U.A . W .-
C.I.o., direot mail repl.y, 1949 
In intervening years, as our union h a 
gro n larger and acquired resourec:;a 
and developed services like OlU' '1)1me 
Study and Engineering Dep rtment, we 
have verified the or1.ginal instinctive 
reaction we h d to time study methods. 
The technical knowled e we have acquired 
1n t he eantime, however, ha'S enabled ua 
t ·o keep up t he fight a gainst time study 
evils. in negotiations w1t h t he support 
of V&l'i:fiable facta. (l) 
c . Asa1nat The Time Studz ethod 
Th•t labor finds partieul.ar disfavor for time study 
1s understands .le. Time studies frequently are t he b ae up-
on which an 1ncent1 ve plan is built . Uauallt the compi-
lation of t h ese time s.tudiea is con.s.idered a function of 
nagement alone. ut apart from this, the very ~ke-up or 
a ti e study is enough to incur the reject1on of some unions. 
The science of time study is lar·gely a human sci• 
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ence which requires per.sonal Judgements by 1nd1v1du l o servers. 
It is at t h i• po1nt that orga nized labor q.ue.st1ons t he f"1nal 
measurement of" t lme w1 th convincing a rgumen tQ' a 
As everyone at all v~r :sed in time study 
knows_ ·t here 1a conaidera le room r ·or 
.honeat differences of opinion. Even 
neutral parties may arrive at materially 
d1f.ferent eoJcl.uslons . (2) 
The only part of a time· study hiclt may e classified as a 
true science is t he :r w time as read .from a watch. Even here 
(l)V1ctor G. Reuther, Director, U. A.' .-c. I.o. Education 
Depa rtment. A c of Time studz, 1949, page 1 
(2) H. A. ~1ll1s and R. E. ontgomery, Organized Labor, 
Vol . III, 1945, page 398 
we find the introduction of the human factor here snap-
ack watch readings are employed. If a comparis-on ls made 
between t he ove.rall time .ot a study and t he S\Ull total of s nap-
back ele ental t ime, 1t ill be found that the latter s t 
least 2 per cent smaller . ~rhis is largely because of t he time 
required ·by the. observer to reveree the direction of' his f1n..-
ger or t humb . ith t h e continuous method of' timing the hu• 
-
.man factor has been restricted to at least the rating and 
le.veling adjustment a. 
It it w..- poasible to measure human performance 
with t h e ·same degree of un1t~rm1t,- aa measuring the speeds 
o:t various m c 1nes, there would probably be no controversy. 
Becau!l time s tud ie:s do introduce the human element, h owever, 
labor lists the following shortcomings 1n . opposit1on. 
1. Averase .Pertormance 
H rold B. aynard admits that a normal reasonable 
perfol:'mance called the verage perform nee has been a:r itra-
rily establish ed · y def'1n1t1o.n. By t he very terms "normal, u 
'~reasonable,' and naver~ge, then, it is i mpossible to define 
accura t ely expected performance of 100 per cent ·efficiency. 
r1 ore pro ably. t he average t1me resulting from a time study · 
repres·ents t he observerts conception of what worker should 
perform. ~The time study observer all too often has lin 1n-
f"lated opinion o£ his experience, background, and interpre-
ti·ve 1ntu1 t1on. For this reason: . 
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The U •• • - C.I.O . 1ne1sts that time 
study should h ve the enef1t O·f the 
worker 's judgment too. (l) 
La or contr acts seldom, 1!' ever, require the time 
s t udy observer to notify t he worker o£ the r ting or level• 
1ng which a.s appl ied during the observation. The s al 
pr ctice is t'or contracts to specify ~hat ti e studies .s h ll 
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oe fi led eo as to be acceasable to the union aa the need ar1ae • 
At t his time the leveling or r t1ng used to factor · or~ r 
performance to average performance 1s open to union. observ•-
t1on. !ore common is the unwritten practice of' the observer 
to show the worker the ratings immediately following t he 
study if a request is made . 
Labor has gone a atep further and in so.me inst nees 
t he st · ndards h ich represent t heoretical average per.f'ormance 
re es tablished by union personnel . The needle trades 1•e a 
not ble exa pl~ here union time study observers re employed . 
This does not i mply t h t labor by using the equipment o£ time 
study ccepts resulting standards to represent true times £or 
average perfol'I!l nees• .By usi ng its o n personnel , however, 
t he union gua1•da against de atable o issions during time 
atud1ea wh1ah would result 1n lower standard valuea. 
2. The Leveling or R tin[$ F)actors 
Time study in itsel.f represents a field of o jecti-
vity 1n which all industrial engineers agree on b s1c princ1 ... 
'I' • : 
(l.) A C of Time Study, U. A;1 .-G. I . o . Eduention Department. 
1949, p ge ·14 
pl.es. There is unl ver sal acceptance on the contents or an 
element, t he nner of reading a watch, and t he definition 
of a work cycle. Unfortunately t here is a w.1.de variance on 
acceptance of the faot .ors which adjust an operator's allowed 
elapsed time as recorded on a time study to an average per-
formance time . Dependent upon the sy.stem employed, the 
standard values resulting :from a time study vary to the ex-
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tent pe·rm1tted oy the rating or leveling factor'.- I t 1a aaumed, 
of' course, that the standard allowance to compensate for fa -
tigue, personal requirements, etc. is the same in such in• 
stances. 
The Percentage Method of rating operator performance 
uses 100 per cent aa representing t he normal pace of" an average 
operator. There are no absolute limits on rating either ex-
ceedingly poor or super performance. Percentage ratings can 
conceivably range from 10 per cent to 200 per cent. 
Another w1dely•publ1c1zed method of adjusting work• 
er performance to avera ge performance is through ·use of l ·e.vel-
1ng factors .· .Absolute h 1p-)l and lo limits are enforced, end 
skill , effort, •nd consistency m.uat be graded within thie r.ngea 
Performance-Rating Table (l) 
Skill +15 or •22 limite 
Etf'ort +13 or -17 limite 
Conditions + 6 or 
-
7 l1m1ta 
Consistency + 4 ox• - 4 l1rn1te Totale ' +!8 or . -mf'"":t 1m1 t. 
(l) Lowry, ·~aynard, and Stegeinerten, Time and · otion Study, 
1941, pa ge 233 
These are but t o of t he ethods used in adjusting elapsed 
t ime , ut they sh o~ th dirferenceo in thinking h1 ch exist 
on the matter. 
3. The Standard Allowance 
To all leveled EJle4 ental ti· as it is standard prac• 
tice to dd an allo ance to co penaate the op rator for the 
a 1ount of fatigue result 1ng from the operation. In addi t1on 
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to t h fotigue factor, common practice is to further increase 
the percent.a ge allowance for per.sonal requirements and inter-
ruptions throughout the work period . 1Vhere plants r e operated 
under a system of time s·tudy, the usual cond1 tion is not to 
ermi t rest periods . I t is a saumed t hat t h e person 1 and fa-
ti e allo1ance is suf1,1c1en t in itself wi thout specific pro• 
visions for rest periods . .ut t here is no guarantee t ha t 
ope r tors ill actually refra in from ork to t he extent per-
m t ·ted by tho s t · ndRrd llo ance. Shop ~uperv1sion usually 
restricts personal time to b ... re minimum requil"aments . The 
reverse is equally true, especially here operators are on 
individual piece ra.tes established from t .ime studies. Ind.i-
viduala y ne lecting proper reet f or fatl ue and time a ay 
fro t he work for personal needs attempt to increase incentive 
earnings. . 'uch minor temporary gains in ea r nings Dl&Y in faot 
result fro const itutional d mage. 
'he Textile orkers Union o · America 1n 1941 adopted 
t he resolution that: 
Rest periods of at least thirty 1nutee 
for oach day ah 11 be gr nted, during 
which time workers may leave jobs and 
enjoy complete rest . (l) 
By :forcing t he accept•nce of asta' llshed rest periods on t he 
industry its contracts covered , the T. !O U .. A!t attempted to 
elimina t e the conditions listed above . A mor . ide•spread 
adoption of rest periods by all of industry woul.d not leave 
l abor alone the ehief benet ctor. 
~qually impor tant to rest periods is the lengt h of 
t h e !Tork week or ork day existing when s t and rds resul.ting 
fr n ti e studies apply • . A piece rate ~onta1n1ng a 15 pe:r 
cent llo ance for fati gue, personal needs, and interruptions 
till not prove as suf.f:i.c1ent toward t he end of sixty .hour 
week as it ould in -a stand .rd forty hour period. 
Another criticism of standard allow .ncee: i s thap 
.hoy ua·ually ·pply · ITi thout distinction b tween t ho sex o:f the 
operator . The same llowances usually appl y 1'or both raw-
boned ·male operato.rs ana dinl1nut1va fem les . 
4. Persona'! Judgements On Level.i!fS 
A(ijuatments or leveling ructors. app:t.ied to ·the pur$ 
watch readin s of atudiea re m de to either 1ncl!:ease or de-
crease tratch time to en "aver ge" performance.. ~.l.'hese adjuat~ 
enta have developed to include t he skill and e.ftort o:f the 
operator, t he working conditions under which the work was pel"-
formed , and the· consistency at Whi oh the operator co~~leted 
(l) 1941 Convention Resolution, Textile ~orkers Union ot 
America 
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t he element in the study., The translation o:f these f ctora 
into pero~nt ge to e anpl i d to the atch readings intro-
duces the Aat ter 9f human judgement . 
It as pointed out in the first ch pter that no 
two orkera are like . T:t e study ob serve1•s ore equally 
diversified .in h en tx•a 1; nd hey dif'f r i n uch qualities 
as experience and aekground . To expect ident!.e 1 juds e ants 
by different observers on such mattfi't:rS. a skill nd effort 
is to expect the irapossible . 
The Glenn L. J,:art1n Company t•eeogn1zad thes.e v · 1'1-
ancas and 1n 1942 approach ed the problem in e .. nner desi gned 
to reduce t he diftore·nces. in judgement existing among its 
time study observers . A ximum of 5 per cent a eats ·. lish-
ed and all observers rare periodically ch ecked s a group in 
an eff'o:rt to restr1et differences in judge . ent oe th level-
ing f ctor to this percentage . .J..n1tial checks on ita time 
study ouservers showed that diffe,.•o-::- ~ s tlt1ng to s h1gh 
as 30 per cent existed bet een ob ervera recording studies in 
assembly sections of' the plant . By constantly exh1'bit1ng 
laver gett performance as demonatrated by model operators 1n 
class it as poa.s1ble to synchronize the thinking of the 
group unt1l m ximum differences in judgement of' the l eveling 
.factor· did not xceed the o per cent parmi tt.ed . An interest-
ing result of t his training · as t h t continuous cl sses ere 
required to maintain the thinking of the time study group 
to the desired level . 
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ore sue ten,1 e and 1ncere effor ts on the 
p rt of man ge ent to stand rd1z:e t h1.nk1nfl ·on the r tin or 
level! t otor x1s t s, the r enta ~ainst personel judge-
ment are n rro ~r e • S l ler pl nta employing one or severa l 
tl e study ob erver seldom r ort to t he syate t1c method 
of ch ecki n g t he 1evel1 .g t•ector a ou+;l !ned b o e . Indeed , 
ny of the 1 r ger f'lrms neglect t h e pro le 
selves t o la or•s cr1tic1 m. 
nd open them-
5 . ImlZroper · nd Insuff'1c1entll, ~rained Observers 
Equally import nt to a stendo rdiza tion of thinking 
on lavel1n . s t he sel ection of personnel t o record t ime 
s,tudies . The recent war perio necessitated t he employment 
o.f ome o servers tor t h is work 1th 1nsuff1c'-ent ckgrounde 
or c Aps illties . orkin knov: l ed e of . ach· nea or sa em ly 
method s wa · a f iclent to jnstify transfers to t he 'l11mc St udy 
De r t ment . E n tod y t h aazne techni(}ue of selection is 
used until t1 m tudy ob erv rs 1n some instances re merely 
t ch reader s . Ex cting f1 .s employ ti e study ngineers 
equslly q 11 .e n ,_at'"oda , pr duct on. co trol, co t , ual -
ity standard , 1· dustr1 1 rela ons , shop m na .. ent , a d 
sa1 es na g _ ent . 
F. otory 
results of irect 
techniques s 
nag e!.<!e t and .aint na1 ee publish ed the 
l l pl in '-"s c 1 dustri 1 pol1c1es and 
n com1~ct1on ~ h ti . ~ study ctiv1tiea. 
on t he que.s t ions on policies and techniques were questi ons 
concern1nc t e tr 1n1ng and background of t1 e s tudy men am-
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' . 
t e o of 
lng 3ol i e1ttJd . 
The most outst~. ncl i t1g i pr.· s'sion to be 
derived f'rom t he l"eeults present&d in 
thi Sf:H3t1on 1~ th!'lt n subat nti l 
nunlber of t l'e co paniea surveyed are 
uning ti e ntudy prooeduren th t are 
t variance ith the tochnlquee reoo -
.:n mded ' :r :cwst ell• qunl1f'i e 'l an z :tnoera •. (l) 
t· a study man is quite com .. n•e . enslve in scope •. 
M.me ntu y ma rl hol ds a 1 po:rt nt po• · 
altion in. the o:t:'"g nization.. It . 1a ea• · 
sa r.t t 1 that a be, a ~ an o ... poise, un .. 
affected by adverae critici3m. and ant g-
o 1 .m, , posessir1i:; a t .. orough k.-10, led1 ·e · 
of his duty to study 1ndustrinl relations, 
:. en, ... aterr•1nla , ac ine and 1. ~thod~; to 
aka recommendetiona and assist in c rry-
1nu t1e. out; also to i mprove conditions 
and eatab1.1sh t ime values th _t will t end 
to .. ncl"' ase product .. on and lower unit 
costs~ and at t he ~ame time provid~ an 
1ncontivo for innr ased interest and 
e.ffoi•t on the part of the workmen tend-
hlg t ow rd hi&~<U' individual earnings . (2) 
The I•aquir'h ents , th n , e1,e relatively high 1n 
quality . .lhoth ar t h &30 principl es re follo·•od 1n gener 1, 
h o 11ever, is ue tiona le . till too frequently t he ti ·3 s ·tudy 
T . ol 1a .L~ut in t b · h one.. ... of m · ny 1:m-
properly and inauff ic 1ently tr 1r1e-d. 
peopl · • '11'1 s uper ·1c :. ~l 1.mplicit;y 
oi' the proc dure «Jhich h as Jllade tim& 
study i16n out o_ any college, or 
so etimes high achool gradt:tates., has 
llaen it , undo;!.! g . (.5 } 
~c . 1, 
{3) Solomon a t•kin , Director of' Hesearch, T. W. U. A., 
Labor Vi_ews The ~~ork1ns Daz, 1942, P•se 4 
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6. Selection of the ,.iorker 
F. d . Taylor i n his early w;r1t1ngs on time study 
expressed desires to study only top worlrers, and jobs for 
which they could be counted upon to give t he·ir 'best perform-
ance. His reasoning aiJ .outlined in ShoR l4$naseme.nt (l) waa 
t h at 1t as f r eiUlier t -O determine t he percentage y h1Cb 
n .average man ill fall short of max!m.ulll per'to~nce then 
would · e po•a1ble it other t han the, 'beat orker was tim$ 
studied. 1'!1his waa before t h e growth of strong industrial 
unionism. 
Labor has resented t his selecti on of t he best 
workers !'or t ime studies since t he established s tandards 
must later be passed by slo er or poor orkers 11' incentive 
earnings are to be realized. Labor contracts in shops work.-
ing under incentives determined t h rough t1me studies now con-
tain clauses on union objectives of operator s-election. Such 
• typical clause reads •• follows: 
Every effort will e made to atudy opere-
tors approaching average status tor the 
ractova to e leveled. (2.) 
Despite auch a reatr1etion, some time study a •·ervera 
·continue to sel.act t b.e workers f'r.am om they can e.xpect t he 
est re•ul ts. At least t h ey •ttempt to obtain ti e atud1ea 
Brothers, Ue York, 1911 
('2) Intern tional Aasoc1a·t1on ot ~ ... aoh1n1sta., A.,.E'.t •. , Local 
Lodge l '790, ·tandard clause, 1.949 a greemt;nt. 
on orirers a ov~ average in 1Jk11J., .intelligence, and con-
sistency. Such reasoning is hum n since the filed studies 
are usually availa· le for union inspection. Ratings ex-
pressing elow average perrorllUince, however justified t hey y 
oe., ll to frequently lead to argument. a, lengthly expla• 
nations, and ill tee.ling etween the time study observer and 
union officials or t he operator himself. 
Summary on Time Study 
While there are some unions hich re.f'use to accept 
even t he sic objectives of time study, 1n general labor 
accepts this science of' me·s·surement.. Chief objections are 
against personalities and t he 1na .111ty of engineers to 
standardi.ze t heir methods of arriving at average performance 
standards. These have een traced in preceding pages . Other 
minor o jectiorts to the make•tlp of a time study exist . 
Through the paaaage of time standards may have be-
co e loos~ with slight changes in method or other t ctor• of 
productivity. Or 1t m y be that old standards not obtained 
fro time studles have been in er.rect . This is equa.lly true 
of Job SC$S1gnments a a 1 t 1.s of piece r!ites.. ~rime atudi&s 
tighten both rates •nd jo · asignmenta .in theeft inatancee. 
The negl.ect of observers t :o accurately detail the 
elements o:t study is .nother cause ot complaint. Short 
cuts 1n recording elem ntal descriptions of ten lead to con-
troversy which may be compl i cated because of an 1nsut'f1c1ent 
pieture. Neglect may also result in no more tha.n a partial 
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picture of other cont~1ou:c1ng factors to the study, provision& 
for hich the back of the time s ·tudy l"orm ha$ been p:t•int·ed •. 
Or it may be t hat in using the ov.ex-all ethod ot 
rating Ol" leveling t he time study observer tends to use the 
s e l veling adjustment throughout th& .study . Actually it 
may be that the oper tor pet•:f'ormed certain el e.ments or group• 
of elements f r bettt>r t han was tru of h1s average perform• 
&nee f'or the ent i re cycle . 
·Abraham Cohen (l), himself' .an accomplished en• 
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gineer on the continent and in U'r.e.a.t Britain h a made criti-
cal study of' some conceptions nd .methode pertaining to time 
study . His quotations and a · ·straeta are particular~y reveal.-
1ng. By quoting directly f'rom the outs.tanding texts on time 
study · oth in this country and road, ho orings out cle•rly 
the difference in thinking emong the top time study flng1neerCJ . 
D. The .Pen .l'ties ot: .Incent1vea 
'l'o the prim.Qry reas-ons $11.d cau.a~a contributing to 
labor's ne gat;Lve attitude to ~U1d a ge 1neent1vea should be 
added a list of 1-nherent penaltie& . Thase pen lt1es are eleaa1-
fied as baing i.nhersnt :d:nce \.hey ar~ f>O ~o:;>ted 1n any 1naent1 ve 
system. 'l'hey re extremely difflcul t to rue au.re objectively, 
and are secondary :to t he main ob ject.io.n , not ad earliet•. Such 
tnatters as qual! ty anQ. group 1neent 1 ve a.dm1n1atra tion are in-
volved , either of v·h !eh promotes orgu.ments on. botb. sidee . 
( l ) A raham Cohen, Time Study and Common Sense,, 1947 
·~d .~ 
1 • . ~~he In.equiti~l3 pf .t:r•Otl£~. 
The vex·y .:dstE.HlC of a group of operatort~ ·orking 
· eolle.eti vely und . r -a ·e incent;1ve . violates the principle o£ 
incre sed e'"' :rn1ngs in direct propor-tion to g:re~t .:r pc.rform-
snce . Th!s ia p rticu.l rl · t .rue ··vrJ.G·l'f.l roup incentive payment 
is pplied :hen individual incentive should · prevail 1nste d . 
Huch oi' this 1r~d1se im1nats uae of' g·roup incentives htH! ctlrr•1ed 
over from tl e · al' ye, 1-.s hen established princlplea 'ere 'V":to~ 
l fltecl .for any of ntune:r ous re&~H:ms .. Ditfererwes in kill end 
e:rfort 'hich e xi.st oe·t .teen workel~s. on 1ndiv1dw l i ncentive 
continue 'hen these .me operstors are united. s dmini.str tively 
into ... ~·· ·grcJup .. ·The t3ndency o .. ' all ~ Or.kers tc;> instinct! vely 
conform to c group psce does not E>nti· aly· e· ese the. highs a ... d 
1011 s of' indiv!Ci' ~l perfo!'m~nc !ftb.:tn ;;r~up incentive . It 
m . · in '1 uenc e a .s t orkers to reduce perf'o:t'PJ.a.nc . somewhat , nd 
slo·,er workers to gener. lly e.xer·~ great. ·~r e.ffor t , but dif"!'er-
enees still re a in . l' o gr·oup 1rtee lti va r::r1.1.ltiplieJ.~ of TJJ gas 
t t- e. clo of a wot•k per•iod :r· px•esent tt.e t:r•ue contribution 
oi ' e ch :tndividu~l !.iS such : rathG:t' 1t 1ndiestes t he performance 
o "' the gr·oup lls a hole.. I~c10llent wo:r•kers , then, are p<~n­
clized by th6 s ·eller ·eontr1(..;ut1on.a to pi'od.uct1v1ty of the 
slower· wo1•kers . 'l1he empl.oy:me.nt or various .r~des of lR oz· • 
and the cl sa1f1catlorl of GOod ·op r.ntor.s f.nto h i gher b2 e t1 ge 
· rackets does not elir,linstg tho :;p~n~.lty , J:or more involved 
assignments follow, and ·orker dif':feronces within 1 bor gradoa 
ren in. Slow workers, too, . ay · e pena.l1~ad through either 
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attempted pe~tormanoe oontra.ry to their w~ry nature, or 
ridicule from other group members . 
2. rester Than Required .Qu~litz 
.Piece rates established with scientif ic aids are 
standards for g ods of acceptable quality., Time studies 
t hus relate methods which oontribu.ted to a product hich 
lo ter passed inspection requirements . AttGmpts to increase 
incentive earnings by reducin"' the amount ot' quality bu1lt 
into products are uickly stopped by either 1npact1on or 
customer oomolaint . Properly organized quality control: 
Results in greater uniformity of product 
and more dependable quality, distinct 
advantage in distribution. (1) 
here competition exists, t hen, and the trend or quality ia 
upward, greater share of the market ean e realized. Such 
an increase for port1cul r products because of good quality 
will benefit affected labor through increased orders. But 
because of jo insecurity Ol:' other related tactorsp the 
o ject1ves of the worker a:re usually :more 1mmed.1ate. Under 
wage incentive he is. attempting to better a piece rate and 
increase his earnings. Quality over and above that required 
to meet inspection requirements tends to reduce these i ncentive 
o Arn 1ngs • IJ:1he worker ' a 1mmed 1 Ate aims of re~ard tor effort 
are penalized by better•than-pas s.able quality. Since much 
work, such a developed assembly, has ao narrow a line etween 
(1) Ralph C. Davia, Industrial Organization and fanagoment . 
1940, page 323 
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paa.aable and rejectable work, and may even be at.feoted by the 
particular mooda or dit.fere.nt 1napec:;tora, extra quality may 
be built .into an item •• 1nauranoe againat poas1ble future 
correction. Q,ual1ty more than aU1".f1o1.ent to permit incentive 
earnings t hua penalize• the operator. 
3·. Length o:r · rork Per1o& 
,Jhere earning• are accumulated daily and the worker 
compensated later on this basis, nominal wagea :represent .fair 
incentive e :rnings. The measurement ·or incentive earning• on 
eekly baa1a, however, may penalize the worker in that 
tluctuat1ona 1n the incentive multiplier are leveled to a 
weekly percentage applied to baae wagea. 
An 1noent1ve plan which re1m'bur· ee the worker dur-
ing tttall•downa" at baae ratea 1mpoaea thi.a penalty when work 
alackena and the worker 1a retained beoauae or .shipment date 
obligation•· on remaining Job a. Relat1 vely speaking , if' in• 
cent1ve amounted to 140 per cent on Monday, 136 per cent on 
Tueaday, 124 per cent on Wednesday, and 90 per cent on Thursday 
and Friday, the mul.t1pl_er applied to base rate• on a weekly 
basis would mount to 116 pet" cent. The favorable incentive 
earn1n0 8 of Uonday, Tuesday, and 'edneaday are reduced, and 
the pertoz:mance h1oh wa s :required t ,o attain these earning• 1a 
forgotten. This again v1olatea the age incentive principle 
of e rn i ng• in direct relation to performance. 
4 . Other Intangible Penaltiea . 
Poor management can reatr1ct incentive earninga 
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t h l"ough planning ,. scheduling, or othet• serv1eea to t he ork .. 
er. The complete attainment of potential incentive earnings 
WlY not be possi le since sufficient work :ahead or t he opera-
tor is not maintained . 
Or t he psychological f'actov .nwy ·oe mentioned here 
a orker h ·S cons istently maintained high nominal ages through 
incentive . I f l i vin standards are geared to t hese earninga 
and reductions in incentive earnings occur for any reason, con-
fusion and debt a r e probsble • 
. summery: 
The opposition of labor to wage incentives hae 
changed durin . the past £orty years but t he arguments l i sted 
on t he preceding p.oges represent curre-nt at t itudes . r e!"erence 
to the appendix ·o.t t h is volume will explain t he m nner in 
which t h ese opinions y lEt"bor were obtained . lany of tbe 
re sons supporting labor's negative attitudes have merit~ 
Some of the othel:te, on time s t udy f'or i 'nstanoe 1 sh ould not 
e advanced too strongly, for while t he l1m1tst 1ona of time 
study are :t'Elco nized y most eng1ne~rs, it still is t he , est 
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and moat 1dely used method ot l! ccu:va tcly deter 1ni ng standards. 
Ita pr~:terence over other m t hocls of e ta li,sh.i ng t nd rda 
1.s illus t r ted: 
!ethod of Establish ing Performance 
St$ndar d:a in 301 Co:m.pani.es. (1) 
Average pes·t experience 
Caref ul anal ys1.s of past raoor de 
qi mple time study analysis 
Detai led time study ang.l ys1a 
Deta iled t1rae and m..ot1on antilya1a 
"'a s1e or char ted da t a 
Nmnber ot 
Companiea 
41 
55 
4'7 
l8S 
9'7 
123 
Per Cent o! 
301 Companies 
13.6 
18 .3 
15 .,6 
62.5 
32.2 
40.9 
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(l) Na t1o~l Industrial Cont'e:rence oard1 ase PazMent Srstexu ..s, Stud1ea 1n l?ersonnel Policies, No. 91, 194S, page li 
Chapter IV 
Union Acceptance nd Harmonz 
A • .Baaic Re aons tor /loeeptance 
The t11ost i mportant single reason which intluencea 
some s · gments of organized labor to .at-d coeptance of age in-
cent ives ia t he financial ga in poaa1 le under plan. This 
will be seen 1n later pa :es here favorable reaction to wage 
incentives re presented . t this point it suffices to relate 
t he part i l results of a survey on w ges by the Dep rtment of 
Labor to sho the differences i n earnings hiah result f ro 
t he use of age incentives • 
. any skilled and a few semi-skill d work-
era ho might earn 90 cent a to <'!'1. 20 per 
hour at straight-time wages, average. 
·1.50 or ore as result of 1ncent1ve 
payment. r.rhus~ f1rst-ola•a olders nd 
first•cl•as r iveters,. who i n other ship• 
yards reo.eive the standard ·1.20 r te , 
have recently averaged ·1.56 •nd '4~1 .• 77 
res.pect1vely, 1n the Atlantic Coast y rds 
where 1noentivct payment is common. Large 
num era of high-wage incentive worker• 
are found in at·eel works and rolling mills. 
Incentive pa ent accounts 1n part tor the 
relatively high wages in the rubbel' in• 
dus t ry, electrical equip ent, ma chinery 
manufacture , nd the prim. ry fabrication 
of nonferrous metals. (1) 
Although there 1s some room for rgument among stu-
dents o:f labor, the prim. ry objective of the worker is ages, 
both re l and nom1n 1. J ob security, pleasant working con-
ditions and the like are important of course, but condensed t o 
72 
(l} onthlyLabor Revi ew, · age 1n Manufacturing Indus tries In 
· artime , Bure· u of ·ta'6or St t1s.t1cs, Oct . end Nov. 1943 1 p ge 25 
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essentials, a n sells s-ervices for t 1nancial wages primarily. 
Even those strongest in opposition to incentive question not 
t he incentive earnings themselves, but the abuses to labor some-
times i mposed to ake these eEH•nings poss·ible. The writer feels 
t hat a unions e.xh ust "£1fth and sixth :round•"' for 1ncre $&a 
in b sic age r toa, an.d the pension and so-called welfare 
issues, t he b r ga1n1ng cycle will revert to ~earninza related 
to productivity. A wid~ ad ptat1on of the use of incent1vea 
1n the not too distant .future can also help bring about a short-
er work week without loec:s in earnings .• 
1
.Ph1s question of higher earnings is broken down y 
Slichter into tour sic reasons tor t he preference of •ome 
unions tor piece work ov·or time ork. 
Given the prerequisites of • meaaur i.Jl 
performance and fairly constant conditions 
of production t hrough title• t hero are four 
principal .f ctor·s which lead unions to 
prefer piecework to t11ewerk : l) certain 
ar a1n1ng advantagea hich it giv-es to 
the en i n dealing 11th 1nd1 vidual e pl.oy .... 
era; 2) its adaptability to t he operation 
o · national trade agreements (or greements 
covering competitive area}; 3) the pro-
t ct1on which it gi .ves ·oth union employ• 
ere and employees a gainst non-union co pe ... 
t1t1on; nd 4) · cloaely related .factor., 
t h e opportunity which a shift to piecework 
e1ves • union to raia the e rninga o.f ita 
members 1thout raising t he employerta 
ls~or costa. (l) 
All -of Sl1·chter 1 s preferences r late either conditions of wagea, 
earnings, l al.:>or coats. or allied factors . 
While unions condone limited individual bargaining 
(1) Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial 
1942, p gas 287-286 
ent. 
---
y its em· ers, these are token aoncess1on s nd t he 1uore 
proba ·le hope is for depend.enee by the rank and .file on the 
union for collect ive ba r gainlng issuea . -·ut if negot iated 
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p iece rates re i n eff'ect and it ia 1mpos 1ble to g i n increases 
in t hese rat s, t hen 'bar ain ing for incroases i n earnings , 
co e 1nd1 vidual issues . This. follows further in systems 1 th 
tandard esta1Jl1 hed unilaterally by m nage ment when additional 
gains cannot be made on base ge r tea. Progress y t he union 
to ard 1gher earninga in such o ses 1s halted, ut individual 
workers can increa se earnings t .hrough addi tiona! performance. 
Remuneration boc o es a matter of' individual bargaining re .. 
lated to worker pel"'.formanoe . ·he better o:t>ker des:tri g addi-
tional s ues can incre se- h 1 e r nings ithout additional grants 
by mana gement . Slo ~el" workers • too, c_s n appl y t emaal vea more 
t horoughly to t heir work and initiate h 1 ., r earnings . Indi-
vidual r.g 1n1ng in such instances is a gree le t o the union, 
:for while it wa• gaining ~age concession s :tor other t han per-
sonal appl i cat ion to task, the e£fo.r t of t he . or k1ng f orce may 
ha ve been h ld i n re erv.en for such a specific condition. 
The intelligent appl1c _ t1on of ";age 1ne.entives also 
prevents t h e je louaies .h ieh previously ca.u sed d1ssent1ona 
~1thin union r anks . 1ght1ng in t he needle trades for t he 
11bundle' during sl c k periods, or favoritism 1n assigning jo s 
·li th g ood incentive earnings potentials can be avoided. A 
success ul age incentive should e :fair, and h ve t h e support 
o.f both management nd t he workera. Such a sys tem is i mpar tial 
in its dispatching o£ jobs ~1thout reg rd to attached piece 
r t ea or stand rds. The ~.: roup sys.tem in p6rticular will pro-
vide i ncentive earnings without promoting jealousies bee use 
of varying earnings by different workers. The earnings of all 
employees tend to level ott: in such instances, and the h i 
and lo peaks which a.re posai le otherwise are limited . y 
strict neutrality in administering a a:ge incentive , then, 
na gement overcomes one of the f ol:'mer reos·ons f or opposition 
by la or to this .me.thod of nominal wage determ1na ti on. 
This m tter o·!' leveled earnings also carries over 
into' t he negotiation 'Of national trade agree ants. The ex ... 
tension of · n a , reement to the ent i re trad.e rea is f c111-
t ·ted by t he use of piece work . good exa~ple is t he agree-
ant currentl y i n force .etween t he National rotherh ood or 
Operati ve Potters and the United States Potters· Assocj,ation 
which extends country-wide i n its scope~ . The wa ge scale and 
size list agreement covers wh ite, granite, and semi-porcelain 
work, and in addition to eata.blish1n0 m1nimUlll hourly wage 
rates, and piece work rates, establishes standards of size, 
weight , finish, nd other characteristics of pt•oducts . Such 
notional trade agreements prevent individual locals f rom in-
ning oonoeaa.iona locally to t he point o end•ngering the 
., 
· 1l1ty of firms to remain in competition. Collective bargain-
i ng is usually .facilitated, too, since t he ob jectives ot• t he 
union apply to all ·cO""..apan1es c-overed by t he a.greement. I t 
such trade agreement used a ge r tes instead of piece rate , 
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the e.:x:iatence of area wege di£ferent1ale: would impose hard• 
ships on both employers and e ployeea alike in di.fterent 
areas. ,ay uaing national piece rates, however , it ia po•a1ble 
tor workers in high wage areas to increase earnings through 
improved pert·ormanoe . 'rhis should prove no hardship on the 
workers since greater skill is usually more wide•apre d 1n 
higherwage areas . 
Summary 
Other less important .reasons influencing la.bor to 
accept wa.ge incentives include tbe d!t'terencea in supervision 
where an incentive is in f'oree, and the looseness of rates 
with · aa . As mentioned !n Chapter I, tha driving type or 
supervisi:on f requently so neoesa•ry in a day work shop is not 
required under a wage. incentive. The reaction of any normal 
worker to t hi s kind of supervision is a natural one, and t h.e 
effects of' a tr nsfer of some O · the GUpervisory duties to 
the worker improves morale. · · ithin l:'eaaona' le limits , the 
e.i ght hour ork period belongs to the operator,. and avoidable 
delsya are his t .o control. 
Piece rates or con.traet prices tend to loosen as 
t hey age, and of tentimes the worker benefits rrom this loose"'" 
ness. Unor changes in method, improvements in managerial. 
services, relaxed inspection requirements, higher quality 
m t eriala· and other sim1liar items help make the job of' the 
worker easier to accomplish . Quite frequently t he 'burden on 
t hose entrusted with t he task of administering pieae rates or 
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-standards is too croat to permit changes of minor stature . 
Slight a vings are po:s.ible, t hen, to those ~ork1ng to rd 
t ese p eae r to a or :1tandsrds 1n. an incant! ve systan1 . 
Jut t 1e chief benefits to unionized .labor o.r e 
incentiveE are the financ ial gains poos1ble 1 nnd the uargo1n-
1ng dvnntageo c.rented oy the use of these ·noent1vaa. 1.'heee 
b a r gaining ndvant gon further breaJt down into 1nd1v1dual 
1orh~r · orgn in1ng f or 1ncre-nsen in earnings after t he union 
has :fa iled to o ta1n nd.d1t1onol concessions on woge matters, 
and the adaptability of piece r tes to national trade agree ... 
ants. current eom!l1ents by r espona1 le leaders in labor 
suppot·ting the so polnts are contained in f'ollo ·Jing pa ges . 
r • .• nbulat:f.on o'f Prevailing Opinions 
U\bor qnAl-fiea its ·'l'eneral ceeptsnc.e or go in-
centives y 1nsist 1n th .t piece ·· ork rat a be subject to 
col l ective ba r .Qa1n1ng . ·ihen no ,such specific raque .st is made, 
one with t he enme result !a required: incenti-ve should not 
e i nat lled unl sa t here is good possibility for t he orker 
to earn ot lc t 30 per cant over base rn t es. This runs con-
trary to e rly m:anageri l ossuroptlcn!J that an gement lone 
has t h e sole voice in a.ete in1ng piece r t$9 . 'Where ti e 
studies nr currently u ed to asta l1sh r tes,. so e companies 
till cllnz to t his un1lster l ~rrangom ;nt. ut the 1ncren u1n~ 
number of incentives presently su jectcd to the ccept nee of 
unions is pu h1n8 t h is ide of n geri. l responsibility £or 
r tes rurt ar into t e oackground. This 1a clearly seen 1n 
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-the followine; taoulation of generally f vora le opinions to1erd 
i'lsge 1ncent:i. ves. 
o incentive should · e e$ta lished unless 
it pays the aver ge qual11'1ed orlter 
oi'king at t he kno m ra te of' speed and 
30 p r cent over b se. Our Org niz tion. 
i n 1hnt ve term b i g Glass., ha s a wide 
cover ge of' incant 1 ve • 'full e i t 1 a an 
item to be coped ith , t he orkers ould 
not e 1111ng to 'i'ork ·ithout an in-
cent ive . (1) 
Jhile the membership of t he Pedera t:l.on of' lass, Cera ic and 
Silic Sand ~ orkers is relatively small 34 1 000, t he condition 
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undex- which the 'eder tion ccepta. · ge incentives is i mportant. 
In t he Li bey•O ens-Ford group, average realized incentive 
amounts to 60 per cent plus or minus over oa e on a pl ant-11de 
basis . Such libe1•al returns would e condemned by several 
leading i ndustr:t 1 engi neers who have recosm ended t he establ ish• 
ment of stand rds ell oelow t his 60 per cent realized average 
i ncentive. 
In the pottery industry t he experience of 1 bor 1th 
age i ncentives ha s oeen fa vorable. Piece rates re ne goti-
ated a nd not determined by ro nagement alone. Incen tlve wa ges 
· nd rate s have een asic i n wage contracts from t he very early 
days of pottery oper a tion. 
t'e are very much for i ncentive p yment. 
Our experience over t he ye rs h s not 
lessened our 11k1n~ for this a.rrang,e ... 
ant •. (2) 
(1) Leland .ceard, Internat1on l 1st Vi ce Pres • ., . ·ed. of Gl sa, 
Cera 1c nd Sil i c Sand · orkera, C.I.o., dir ect mail reply, 1949 
(2) J mea ~ · Dufry, President , ational Bl"otherhood o:r Oper tive 
Potters, A. "' .L,., direct ..1 ail reply, 1 49 
Approximately 90 per cent of the 30~000 membel'a of the National 
.Brotherhood .of Operative Potters are under wage 1noent1 ve. 
Piece :vates a:re ne .,.ot.i ated nd published in its labor contract 
a.s a v;s ge Seal.e and Size List Agreement •. 
This philosophy o.f labor'• participation 1n the 
adnt1n1sti•at i on of' wage ince.nt1ves 1s strengthened by t he atand 
of tha Reta1l Clerks International .Aaaooiation. I ts experience 
1th wage .incentives h s btHtn limited, and at present less t han 
5 per cent of its total Diembersh1p or 200 1 000 1:J under some 
wage incentive . It is receptive 1n its att:ttude toward wa ge 
incentives, ho ever, and favors t heir expana1on 
11' t he Union is given an equal voice in 
their establishment ar1d expanaion. (.l) 
The powerful International Ladies Gar.ment ~ tor.kera 
Union with 4101 000 members ould take no official etand on the 
matter of wage lncentivea. Approximately 75 per cent of ita 
membera are working on piece work ratea. however,. and the Union 
has a voice in their de·terminatton. 
There are ocea•1onal arguments tor time 
work, out presumably t he majority of the 
membera do not accept. (2) 
Actually t h e I.L . G. ~ . u. t h:t'ough ita history doea accept wage 
1neent1ve~h After years of active oppoa1t.10n to piece work, 
t he Union convention endorsed time work 1n May 19·18. D1a-
(l) William ~ - ··cGuire, Director or Research " Retail Clarka 
Internat:i.onal Associeti.on, A .F .L~, direct mail reply, 1949 
(2}lcark Stan, Educat .ion Di:t'ector, International Ladies Gar ment 
Workers Union, direct mail reply, 1949 
79 
s a,t is.f a ction with tima ·or k prompted a return to piece work 
1n 1933 s nd t h e. UI ion h . s succeaafully negot i a t ed rates eve~ 
since. 
Close to 90 per cent of the employees in t he 
Amalgamated Clothi n ·· ilorkers of P-.mel"'iea are employed on a piece 
o_r;k baeis . I t s contracts eover principally all of t he en•a 
a ppa r el rc: nuf actur1ng i ndustries • Spec1f1c problE:~ms of th1a. 
h i ghly compt3"t1 t i ve ino::.ls ·try h ave 1sd e piece work neces-s r y .. 
The Union t h rou h ne gotia tions on p1eca :rat:ea h~• obtained 
gene r l a ccep t Qnce by its membel"ah i p of wage i ncent i ves.. But 
i n t h e name vein of t hought an other union&·; it disfavors the 
indiscrimi nate appl i cation o:t' wage incentives. 
re are very familiar with the sbusea that 
have formerly and in some oasea presently 
accompany the use of wage incentives. 
Only whe.n t here 1a a strong responsible 
union in the picture can t h ese abuses ·oe 
eliminated. (l) 
'Ito continue a"long t his t h eme that management alone 
ahould not determine piece work rates.* the United Te xtile \' ork• 
era o£ America g&nel'ally c.cep ta wage ineenti vea along t h e 
following lines: 
As • t rade union, we insist t hat wage in-
centives be introduced only th::rough the 
process ot collective burgaining . F~· 
t h er, changes and adjustments cannot bet 
made by employers in a un:i~ateral manner. 
Finally, we. insist t hat all complaint• 
eo 
{1) H. H. Bookbinder, Assistant Director of Research, Ama.l gamated 
Cloth i n g ~ 'orkers or America, C.I.o., direct mail reply,. 1949 
bout t he operation of the incen.tive plan 
.ust be handled through the grievance pro-
cedure esta 1. s .. ed t he collective sr-
gain1nB agree ant . (l) 
These affirmative opinions are largely of local 
development. This 1n turn ha s stemmed ch iefly from t he ex-
periences of affiliated unions and locals with wage 1nce tives . 
The Congress of Industrial Organizations, for instance, is a 
f dei•ation nd does not indulge in collective argaining . As 
a result it h s no ezpresaed policies on wage incentives, ut 
leaves it up to its international unions to determine suitable 
attitudes and polici·es. 
ven here t here are some 1nternat1on ls with no 
formMl policies either for or against wage incentives. Par-
ticular c ses are usually taken up as t hey arise , nd sep rate 
policies deter 1ned after a consideration of t he merits o 
each case. Usually guiding such policies is the motivatin 
force of t he protection of t he worker .from buses in t he es• 
tablishmer t nd execution of wa ge incentive plans. 
cor b i1 tion o opp sition to unilateral action 
. y man · ge;u m t , and the ·de·cermlna t .i on of' local policy is .follow-
ed y t e ~ p lolRterera' International Union. 
\ e ve not 'lleen able to b:r•e k do· n our over-
all exper iences on wage incentive plans. 
The a ,t1tude of our Local Unions varies 
from area to area . Our general attitude, 
(1) Sol Davison, Associate Director, Rose rch & Educat ion 
Department, 'rhe Textile ~lorkers of America, A. F .L., direct 
mail reply, 1949 
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howe~Ter, 1 ... that e do not actively oppose 
such plans. but instead t t empt to -ake 
·c· em na equl table ai3 pos>:J.i le so t wt they 
ill serve the ceat p oa..aible, interest or 
our l• embe.rs , 1heraver t hey are in effect. (1) 
The United Pape~orker of Jlnerica similisrly hoa an 
a ttl tude tO\-rsrd w-0 G i noe nt i vea hich va ries throughout the 
plants covex•od y its representRtion. ~he Union has ~ 
ne~ther a pro nor con . out guarded attitude 
toward .age incent1 ves. They are w.a·tched 
ccrefully i n construct i on and operation. (2) 
currently t he Union covers 50,000 workers by its contra c ts , 
approxi a tely 25 per cent of h om are workin ·' under w ge 1n-
cent1veo. Its pas t experience wit h wa 0 e it centives ha een 
:tair. 
In t h e clerical worlmrs' f'ield ·we find t he Office 
E!mployees International Union operating i n a comparative man-
ner . Since th9 probl em of 'li ge incentive& has not come before 
any of its conventions or before its International Executive 
Bost•d, t he Unicn ha s taken no official position. 
lhere the problem ha s arisen, the reaction 
o oux looQl union s h" s rnuged 'roLl accept-
ance , ·r eluctant acceptance., and also out-
:right r eject ion. Their experience with t he 
plana has in some instances been f avorable 
· nd in othel"S unfavorable . (3) 
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(1) David v esps ,. Education Di rector, Upholsterers t International 
Union, A.F .L., dlrec't uil reply. 1949 
(2) Nat Gold.f.f.n ger, Reaearch Director, United. Paperworkers or 
America, C.I •. O., direct mail reply,. 1949 
I 
(5) L. G. ygzten, Vice President, O:ffico Employees International 
Union, . l'"' .L,., direct i l reply_, 1949 
c • . :E!nllght ened Leade:r~hip 
Unemployment t h rough high prices c n result from in-
creasing labor costa ln competitive indus try without correspond·.., 
ing incre sea in worker productivity. Unions gaining such 
temporary concessions encourage demand. for lower priced non-
union goods. 
··age incentives. ho ever, 1nore .se wages without 
adding to labor costs~~ Increaaea in real wa gEJs tollo t h rough 
lower prices i n which workere as a · el,.:ss are an i mporton t part 
of t he consumer m8r.k~t. Or nominal wage increases may result 
without increa ins JAlbor costa where financial incentives are 
used to relate these costa to worker productivity. That such 
a favorable combination of the two has marked our industrial 
progress is seen in the following: 
In 19~9, un1t labor cos·ts 1n manufacturing 
industries was 44 percent lower than in 
1919 and wholesale prices of manutaotured 
· goods; 38 percent lower. Average hourly 
earnings, on the other hand were 28 percent 
higher. 'l1he baa1s for the wage increaaea 
and the deolinea 1n un1 t labor ·cost and 
prioee waa the large rtae in output per 
man•bour. (1) 
The 1nd1 vidual contributions of al.l 1nfluene1ng taetora are 
immeasurable,. but that labor lett ita impression 1& without 
dispute. 
Organized labor \fell real1Z&a the importance ot 
(l} t onthll Lat>or Re,view, Productivity Cl.!angea Since 1939# 
Bureau of Labor Stat'iatica, December .l94t:).1 page 2$ 
11m1 t1.ng unit labor cos ts to permiaf.Jlve levels tor com.pet1 t1 ve 
.fil"nls to continue in . usiness. ~Pb.a recent decision of the 
IJ~extile · ·orkers Union of 1\merioa, 0.1.0., to forgo hourly 1" te 
increases in ito 1950 gree ants covering t he New .... n glnnd area 
repre.aenta direct reaaon1ng along thia line . Regional di~fer­
encea in joil rates between plants covered. by ita agreements 
in the Northeast and the south impose competitiv~ hardshlpa 
on t hose f'1nns 1n the New England a :rea~ 
~V1th wage rates 1n the 11 ortheaet represent• 
1ng an index or 100, those in the South 1n 
1945-46 we:re only as,. a wage d1ff~rent1al 
ot 15 per cent. (1). 
Tb1a ••me survey 'by the Bureau ot Uho·r Statistics, alao em-
phaa1zed that the percentage d1.t'terencea between the h i gh and 
low wage region• was: about the same in 1945•4,6 aa in 1919. 
Efforts such as those of the T.w.u.A. to limit wage rate in .. 
c r ea$&8 in the h igh coat areas covered by its .tigreementa can 
also eliminate 1n time this perpetuation of regional ditt'er• 
encea. During the 1nter1m period, increased earnings are 
poaa1ble in high cost plants with wage incentives t hrough 1m• 
proved worker performance• 
The example of the T •• U.A. in 1ta 1950 •greementa 
illustrates recognition of the high labor cost problem by 
responsible labor leaders. A more direct acceptance of wage 
inoentivea aa a method of containing or reducing unit labor 
costa has been the policy o:f the Amalgamated Clothing iorkera 
of America. 
(l) [onthl.y . Labor Review, Trends in Wage Differential a 190'1•4'7, 
Bureau of Labor Stat!$t!ca, August 1948, page 2 
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-Practically 11 of our t:lmployees 1n. the 
men' a· apparel mllnura·otur1ng 1ndustr.1ea 
are mployed on straight piece work 
baaia (roughly about 90%). We have 
found thst the specific p~obl$ma .or our 
highly competitive industry made such 
pi .ce work neces ry. (1) 
Throughout 1ts history t he . slgamated .Clothing Workers h 3 
recognized t n e import.ance of labor costs in competitivce 
products nd h s eneoura e ..... d n expansion o:r w ge i ncentives. 
Its policy of also assiating in 1mpr.ovements i n methods and 
cost reductions has enabled ita membership to cta1nt&1n accept•· 
able e rn1ngs ., .Such pproaches to t he unit l bor coat problem 
h t:rcre dr1 ven non ... un1on co pe·tl. tlon from the men' a apparel 
manufacturing industry. The standardization of labor coeta 
t h roughout t J:le country which wa• begun 1n 19~9 at the insist-
ence o'f the late S1dney Hillman ha arao helped t he :me . erahip 
increase earnings . .Benefits from changes .in method11 ac('\x-ue 
to .t he workers Iince labor costs are standardized ~hl'ough piece 
W'='J.k ratea. 
eapona1b1e labor leadership,. then. is enlightened 
to an acceptance or the control of unit la or coats in oompeti• 
tive industry, and the use of' wage incentives to relate theae 
coa·ta to woz,ker productivity. Such leadera are not perturbed 
by fear·a or &tpeed-upa or a uses to labor polllible when wage 
incentives are in f'orce, for labor• nagement bargaining toola 
are more equal on · oth aides t han in t he ptust. Such clear 
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(1) H. H. Bookbinder, Assistant Director of Research, Amalgamated 
C.lothing Vorkers of America, o.r.o., direct mail reply, 1949 
unpre ud1ced unlo 11tt~.:tudes t ,w rd tg go incent ives can oon-
tr1oute uch to better standards o liv-*ng throu 1 1nc r A ed 
production, hi ·hel' earnings it' ou; cor responding increGsed 
unit la or oo ta , a1 ore l e1aure t-t e for l a or . 
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Chapter V 
Union Policies Under a.ge Incentives 
The existence of age i ncentives in unionized indus-
t ry i nvolves t he union in a set of conditions not found .i n a 
time payment environment . Chief •mong t he ne factors 1s the 
protection of t he worker from abuses or potential abuses 
h ich may _  result from incentive payment. Prac t ically all of 
t he ml_on's extra attention is directed toward this goal • 
. hat some concessions apart from this have een gained on in-
centive issues speaks for the strengt h of organized la or in 
our economy. 11th wage incentive plans, new factors must e 
negotiated, the organization of t he union enlarged , and t he 
£ormation of ita policy carried out in line with the differ-
ent conditions. 
A. Contractual Inclusio~ 
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Labor contracts negotiated in shops 1th out a ge 
incentives cover t he asic issues of union m~- ersh1p , seni-
ority, hours , sse wage rates, the grievance procedure and 
arbitration, and miscellaneous additional items. hen a ge 
incentive plan is in use, an expansion of the wage section of 
t he contract i s necessary. The ma tters of down time or person-
al transfers so rout ine in a day work plant become issues sub-
ject to collective b r ga1ning since nominal wa ges are involved. 
This is not to infer t ha t management has a direct obligation 
to argain on these issues, ror the Taft-Hartley Law speoi£iea 
only as f'ollo s: 
For the purpose of this section, to 
argain coll·ectively is the per.fOJ"lnilnoe. 
·of the mutual obligation of' the employ-
or and t he representative of the employ• 
ees to meet at reasonable tim.es and con• 
ter in good .faith with respect t ·o wa ges, 
hours, and other terms and conditions ot 
employm.e nt. ( l) 
It does indicate, t hough., that unions are more interested 
in nominal wa ;ea in shop s with wage incentives, than they 
a.re in ase rates. l 1thout exception, all la or contracts 
under se incentives contain provisions to protect t he 
employee frQlll loss of incentive ~ami s not the c use or 
t 1e orker:e Dependent upon t he strengt h of the union, or 
t he att i tude of mana ement, t he num er of "guarantees" to 
·• wage incentive earnings level v ries etween diff erent 
a greeme·nt s • 
These additional contractual ino~uaions necessary 
under a wage incentive plan are contained chiefly in the 
" age Rates" section of' the labor contract. They include 
t he provisions t:or down time, i ncentive standards, t r ans:f'era• 
•h1!"t premiums, and earnings to be paid during vacations. 
I nvolved is· a new list of matters to be bargained, and since· 
nominal wages are involved, labor· unions attempt to maintain 
incentive earnings t o the fullest ext·ent possible. 
The maintenance. of' incentive· earnings d.ur1ng per1oda 
of non•productivity is usualiy···i 'ccomplished . 1th t he use of an 
average earnings rate. A past work period dur~ng which the 
' ' (l) Labor :anagement Relat;ton~ Act of 194? as. amended, Sec. 
8 (d) 
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worker as employed 1mder an incentive Jlan 1s usually se-
lected from t he preceding ociel ecuri t y c 1 ndar uarter . 
The total 11 ages under 1ncenti ve stimulus for t his period a:r•e 
t hen divided y t he number of weeks t he period cove1·s, or y 
t he hours orked to arrive at an hourly avera ge rate , and the 
resulting figure represents average earnings. L· or feels 
that the worker is entitled to these wages at all t i es he is 
actively at work since his average earnings figure represents 
what t he orker oul.d have real~zed in nominal income l:f 
interruptions beyond his ·control did not occur . 'anagement 
o"i.)jects to the use or avera ge e rn1ngs in such a case of down 
ti e , for instance, h ich may until corrected oe similiarly 
beyond the control of m na ge en t. It considers the payment 
of' avera ge earnings objectionabl e since it compensates the 
worlcer f'or extra effort which is actu lly non- existent s.t 
the ti e of payment . ut the use of aver~ e earnings appl ied 
to certain types of transfers, vacation payment , holiday t~e 
and t he like is increasing . 
To guarantee incentive ea.rnings for vacations, 
the usual spe,o1ficst1on is :for payment wh ich is based on ver-
age straight time earnings. sim111ar method of' payment 1s 
made foi' holidays entioned in t e contra.ct ·as p id-tor holi-
days. The procedure f or personnel transfe~s is somewhat 
different for it usually applies only to assignments of a 
special n ture and not because of a reduced woJ•k load. If 
t here is re l ar incentive work avail abl e and ma n gement re• 
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quest s t he transfer of an employee :for sp cial a ss i gnments 
on wh ich previous incent i ve earnings could not; e maintain-
ed , most unions insis t that average e rnings apply. 
Rat er t hen quote !'rom the multitude of la or 
contracts hich are availa le , t he 1949 a greement of the 
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estingh ouse Electric Corporation and t he Intern tional 
Associa tion of ~ achinists ha s been selected. It is a repre-
sentative agreement since it cover s a plant with t he tandard 
Hour type of wage incentive, standards for which are establish-
ed by time s tudy analysis . ut since t hese standards re de-
termi ned uni l terally y ma naaement it was necessary to re-
vie other labor- management agreements. 
Sp!3cifically, the chief addit ional sections of a 
labor contrac t in a wage 1ncent1 ve shop are as foll ows:· 
1. Ti me Standards or Piece Rates 
fuether rates are set either by the employer or 
t hrou h negotiat ion ith union representatives , contract 
provisions arf:\ usually made to make t hese rates au ject to 
joint revie y both parties. Usual specifications provide 
that 11 contr ct prices, piece rates, or time standard& 
shall be £1xed before a job ha s een started. Changes in 
rates can only be de where changes in method, quality , or 
materials o n oe proved to exist differently fro t hose at 
t he time t he rate was installed . Even t h en these chan es 
must be approved by a union r epresentative before they oan 
become effective. 
To i nsure compliance with t hese provisions, t he 
f ollowing agreementis cited: 
o incentive work shall ~e started until 
af ter t he contrac t price has been fixed. 
l o employee shall be assigned to in-
centive work under a cont :r:•act unless a 
copy of t he contr act descri ing t he wor k 
is delivered to him in person prior to 
h i s co encing work. There shall be no 
reduc t ion made in t he contrac t price 
during the progress of t he job or after 
t he completion of any job , except .when 
some reduction is inade in t he quantity 
or quality of work origi nally specified 
1n t he incentive work contr act and any 
employee's compJaint concerning hia in-
centive contract may be taken up tor 
ad justment. 
Piece work rates shall be s ub ject to re• 
vie an ad justment as to varia lea and 
inequities only in conne ction t herewith , 
i n accordance with t he procedure herein-
after t lished, upon t he applica t ion 
any in .arested employee, or of t he 
ni.on, or of t he Corpora t ion. 
A l i st of piece wor k rates existing a t 
t he t i me of t he execution of thia Agree-
ent shall b~• maintail!ed 'by the Corporation, 
and .. shall be available for examination by 
•ny employee or by the Union representa-
tives upon application to a person desig-
nated by t he Corporation .for that purpose. 
In accordance with present practice, changes 
in any established piece work r a tes and new 
piece ork rates shall oecome effective 
after t hey have been agreed upon y the 
Foreman or Department Head o£ t he Depart-
ment concerned and the Union's Shop Steward; 
end any such new piece work ra t es shall pe 
i ncorpor ated in the arores id list. (1) 
rh~re standards are determined from time·' studies 
or em iri oal data by ma na gement alone, t he uni on insists a s 
(1) e York Shi p" uilding Cor pora tion and Industr i al Union 
of arine and Shipbuilding V orkers, CIO, 1941 
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follows: 
Time standards shall be based on a care-
ful analysis of t he work to e done and 
t he opera tion sequence .of elements with-
in t he cycle considering all fact ors in-
cluding surrounding wo rking conditions. 
Time s tudies with supporting data shall 
a kept avails le. (1) 
The maintenance of a ,file of' tiine s.tudies subject t o union 
revie~ insures completeness, and general fUlfillment of 
contract obligations re garding ' standarda. there deviations 
from ne gotia t ed practice are suspected or assumed; the union 
has recow•ae to t he grievance procedure • 
To prevent abuses of earl i er a ge incentive plans 
where management indiscriminately cut rates to meet compe• 
tit1on or reduce lauor cos t s, restrictions on t he changing 
of rates are inserted into t he a greement: 
Permament time standards once adequately 
set sholl rem in unaltered except f or 
clerical errors, or h ere changes have 
- occurred in t he job content, methods, 
tooling equipment, or matet"ials used in 
t he manufacture of the product, to a auf-
ficient degree t o jus t ify a r et1m1ng and 
subsequent revision of t he elements ef-
fec t ed. The shop steward ahall be notifi• 
ed of changes in per.mament val ues . (2) 
Jhere changes ·in standards are installed, the union can com-
pa re t he old dettals of performing the job concerned w1 t h t he 
new procedure by r eferring to t he file of time studies. And 
again , viola t ion of this provision can be carried through 
(l) leatinghouse Electric Corporation ... - International Associ-
a t ion of ~tachinista, 1949 Agreement,. page 6 
(2) Ibid. at page 7 
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t e griev nee p~ocedure . 
here time s tudie s predominate s t he origin of 
stAndards or piece rates , t he manner of levelin and the 
st nd rd. a llow nee to be applied to stud ies is detailed in 
t he a greement. Usu lly these items ra . eat l ished oy 
management as one o£ i ts ·.:.. 1• g -d . v ' 3 , and concurred in oy 
t he union. Occasionally they re ne gotiated as allowance• 
for fatig~e or personal needs. 
Actual o served times Ior e ch element 
shall be veraged . The average element 
time ill be leveled ±'or effort, skill, 
consistency , and conditions to a normal 
se element time cycle. Every effort 
will be made to study operators approach-
i ng ever p;e s tatus f or the factors to be 
leveled. The asic element t i me 111 e 
increased by 15 per cent for all anual 
element s a 10 per cent for all auto tic 
chine-fee d elements. ddi tional fact ors 
may e allo:ved f or recurring conditiona 
inherent in t he job eyond the contr ol of 
t he operator. (1) 
2 . . intenance of I ncent i ve Earninss 
As pointed out in an earlier chapter, ~ions in 
accepting e incentive expect to increase earnings 1th 
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increased orker productivity . Unions like ise desire to main-
tain earnings at these h i gher levels when interruptions be• 
yond the control of t he worker restrict ap licat1on to task • 
aterials. vary at ti s'", and ithout additional eo pensation 
t he worker ould e penalized. Subst i tutions in ma teria~·  
are sometimes necessary in order to meet production oom-
(l) Ibid. at page 7 
mit ants . Standards .for t he hand drilling of holes in a 
low c r on content t ype of steel plate, for instance, in-
stead of mild mi.ll steel will prove inadequate. 
Special allowances will b e ade on extra 
ork tickets to compensate for occasional 
difficulties encountered due to faulty 
mater1 1 or equi ment not normally in-
herent in t he job. (l) 
Such o typical clause will p~nalize man gement for i mproper 
machine maintnnance. ·~1 t hout such a contr ct provision it 
oul d ' a po sible t o ne l ect ma chine repairs in the expects-
tion that orkor ef o t ould be 1ncre, sed instead to main-
tain incentive e rnings. 
For n goti ted paid- for holidays falling Wi thin 
the re ular ork '.'leek here incentive earnings ordi na rily 
are sn t1c1p ted, uni ons requir e n u vers ge earned1• rate for · 
payment. This gu ranteea t he incen~ive worker a continuance 
oi' incentive earnings even during periods of in ct1v1ty where 
no extra effort i s · ctually applied. 
he Company agrees to pay incentive work-
ers t he avera ge earned rate for t he previ-
ous Soci 1 Security calendar quarter ••••• 
for t he following seven holidays observed 
during t he regular ork week ••••••• (2) 
A zsome rha t sim1lie r arran ement f ollo-rta for earned vacation 
days. 
Thi s "average e rni ngsn cl use is also employed to 
prevent assi · :mnents for reasons of personality to .j o s 1th 
(1) I 1d. t page 7 
(2) Ibid . et page 4 
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poor h istory of incentive enrnin s. It also restricts 
na ge ent in transfors of~ incentive orkers for reason 
other than tor lack or ork. 
Summary 
It on incentive employee has regul r work 
avail oLle a.nd is requested mana · ment 
to perfor.Dl special ssi _nments , h is super-
visor 111 authorize an vera ge e rned 
r te . (1) 
These general contr ct pr•ovisions ind-icRte , then. 
t o ch ief o j ee t i veo y 1 or working under a w ·e incentive 
plan: l) t he el1m1n t1on, or at lease mvditi.c tion of uni-
1 teral rate setting by mana ge ent; and 2) an attempt to 
maintain incentive earning s even ith out the ap lie tion of 
dded worker effort. That man e ant has acquiesced to theae 
demands not le ally required as collective ar~a1n1ng points 
is an indication of the trend of current manegement-1a or 
re1 tiona . 
B. Union Structure 
Th organizational atruotur e of a union must also 
e e.xp nded in a ge incentive shopo to naure ann erial 
compliance to union requ1rerJents of incantive administration. 
Educat i on and oseorch Dep r t ents in lar e unions dea1ing 
1it incentives i n so e of i ts loc ls must include time study 
ex arts s protection ga1nst possible ~anagerial a uaaa. 
usiness gents, too, must e 1 11-versad in 11 ppases ot 
a ge incentive methods . 
(1) 1 id . at p e 6 
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But the chief burden tor policing incentive 
administration i .s in the shop itself where stewards or shop 
committees must separate grievances and .institute corrective 
me•surea to eliminate abuses. In an early paper on workshop 
committees. c. G. Reynolds (1) suggests questions in connection 
ith which shop organizations should supplement ordinary 
union activities. Chief mong these questi,ons in shops with 
piece work rates were : 1) discussions with management on the 
detailed methods of rate t1x_1ng; 2) o aervance to see ·that 
piece rates are so set sa to yield at least t he standard rate 
of earnings ; 3) discussions ith management on reductions ot 
piece rates where these yield higher earnings than the 
standard; and 4) investigation of workers• complaints as to 
inability to earn the standard rate. A further suggestion 
was to have a representative of the workers attached to the 
rate setting department to check all calculations. He in 
turn would report to t he shop committee which ould then 
confine discussions ith manage ent to principles. These 
suggestions are presently oeing followed generally by unions 
with some modification even though developed thirty years ago. 
Where time study is the method used to set rates 
or values, union stewards or committees are essential to guaran-
tee fair standards. Whether these union members actually 
assist in t he t aking of studies or merely insure that uni-
lateral managerial studies eonform to accepted ·or negotiated 
(1) John R. Commons , 'J.'rade Unionism and Labor Problems, 1921, 
pa ges 293·294 
procedure, t hey are still vital to t he needs or t he union . 
The duties of t hese mem· ers represent duties over and a ove 
t h ose required of shop stewards in time worked plant. In 
some cases these members are trained v t .{1e uni on research 
dep rtment at the union 1 s expense . In others t hey are train-
ed y t he co pany. The 1 948 a reement between a t idwestern 
auto parts company and the United Automobile, Aircraft and 
Agricultural Implement orkera of America, c.r.o., provides 
for such traininga 
The union time study committee shall be 
composed of five mem ers. The time study 
stewards shall devote full time to matters 
pertaining to time standards as .set forth 
in t his rticle. Time study stewards 
shall be elected tor a term of four years. 
The term of at least one and not more than 
two members of the committee shall expire 
each year. (1) 
The use of pricing committees in the needle trades or pottery 
i ndustry is a some hat similiar burden placed on t he union 
t h rough t he use of wage i ncentive plans . 
Since it is 1 practical in small locals to maintain 
such special mem era versed in the f'iner details of a ge in-
cent i ves, consultation is made ~ith t he international where 
s uch personnel are employed . The International ssoc1ation 
of ch inists , for instance, employs experts on time study 
at t he rt rand Lodge" level. Small locals such as #1790 in 
t he Boston ares covering approximately 1500 mem ors use either 
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(l) tion 1 Industrial Conference Board, age Pa~ment Systems , 
Studies i n Personnel Policy, No. 91, 1948, page 3 
t '1e serv ces of t he interna tional, or t h e business a gent . 
/her such condition exists, there is dou le duty on the 
shop ste ard to police the incentive system from the union 's 
vie - point. 
In add! tion to the ordinary atchf'ulness for safety 
baz rds, supervisory abuse, sanitation and t he like, t h e shop 
ste ard br nches into incentive mattera. He represents the 
.first step in t he grievance procedure. The timid nature ot 
so e orkers to hold back material suitable for complaint 
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s kes the steward's task 11 the harder . His proba le causes 
tor use of the grievance procedure include f ctors vhich pre• 
vent -~orkers .fro attaining peak 1ncenti ve earnings; or causes 
surroundinc t he rates themselves . ~lore detailed points in• 
clude vigilance against transfers nd the multiple consider-
ations attached, and atchfulneas on the use of properly 
raded la or on incentive work. ithout prop r operational 
assignments of' group embers of varying laoor grades, group 
earnin s ould tend to be lo er. 
C. Deter ination of Incentive Sta.nderds 
Some age incentive plans are ased upon ither 
physical output or a measure of' output v lue. The' Share ot 
Production Plan advanced by the Eddy- Rucker• . ickols Company, 
f'or instance, relatea payrolls for hourly-paid workers to 
production values. These values repreaent the dlffer~e be-
tween tot•;L sales and total coat of materials) supplies, power 
and out-of-pocket manufacturing expenses . eyond these de-
p rtures from more tradi tional plans~ piece rates or 
at ndards ar generally set in one ot the f-ollowi ng mann ers: 
1) unilateral ction by msna Pement; 2) joint deter i nat1on 
by both la or and ana gement; or 3) negotiations. 
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Piece rates determined by management alone :rrom 
time s t udies are considered se1.ent1:f1c values, and except 
where t here are changes 1n job c·ontent, they remain unchanged. 
uring periods of industrial eontrscti on t here may be a gen-
eral tighteninG up of ne piece rates through delet 1.on of 
borderline elements,. ut i n general values represent t h e 
same amount of' work at all times. 
V here piece r ates are deter ined by both la or and 
IllQna gement, or through negot t tions; chat1gea i.n rates :reflect 
t he ability of employers to sust in uni t labor costa at vari• 
ous levels. A prom1ment consideration which has i nduced 
unions to acc.ept adverse clauses 1n t heir a gPeements during 
period of dopression in t he ps s.t has been in 
t he adoption o.f a cooper t ive poli;cy in 
sharing the depression with t he employ-
ers so t hat benefit would aeerue to t he 
nation when business 1 proved. (1) 
Supporting t his consideration. Wyckoff cites among oth ers• 
the experi,ence of t he National Brotherh ood of' Operative 
Potters. Decreases in piece rates ot 15 per cent to l 8 .per 
cent i n 1921, and an inereaae in piece work x-ates of' 6 per 
cent hen business conditions i mproved 1.n 1923 resulted f rom 
(l) Ventrees J . yckoff, The Vage Policies of Labor Organi-
zations , 1923, page llO 
collective argaining with the employer 's association . (1) 
ere ne ,otiated or jointly determined ork is the 
cont1 ve, t .hen, ch n ,es i n r tes tn~e usually de to keep 
pace i th ndu tr~. 1 act vi ty . 
The lation l Industr1 1 Conference Board (2) in 
1 948 made n extens1 ve stu y of w :>e 1ncenti ves nnd the 
anner in which incentive rates ~ere e tablished. An 1m-. 
ort nt conclusion to be z; de from this survey is that the 
thod.s followed in setting incentive r tea are often au -
,jeat ed to collective berga 1n1ne, nd that 1eoe r tea or 
standords ore set as ment1 oned on t he pre.ced1nF pa ,.e . 
1 •. J oint .~ rt1c1,pa ti on 
T needl.e trades have tr'dition lly detorm!ned 
piece r tes i n conjuncti on with :management representatives. 
T e 1948 a gree.e t of t1e textile e ploy r ' :ssoci t on 
and t e I te n tionsl Lndiea ' a ent orker ' Union pro-
vide a t hat prices s 11 be et in the ollo ing mann : 
11 piece price s all be settled be-
tween the employer and a price c ommittee 
of not loss th n three nor more th n 
five chosen i n each esta lisl:unent and 
represantin as r .r as ossi le diff'.er-
nt branches or the wor • The prices 
on new .styles shall e adjusted wit n 
two days. otherwise the workers shall 
not be required to do t he ork • ( 3 ) 
(l) Ibid . at page 71 
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(2) ational Industrial Gonfel~ence Board, '1a f5.e Parint Systems , 
Studies in Personnel Policies, t o. 91, 1948 , pa ges 8-19 
(3) Ibid. at page 1 9 
U. A. ¥1 .-C . I . O. contr ct provisions for co npany- train d union 
tim study stewa d s also laad to j oint participa tion in t e 
sett1n· of rate~ . Piece rate in sue in tances ere ither 
deter !ned y n age lont ti . e study persoru el and var1£1ed 
y u:n1on stew rds , or o ta ned from stv.dies by the t v1 o in 
c•se1 or controver y . 
2. Unilater~l Action 
he ana garial respon3" ility .... or rate setting 1s 
carry- over f r om tho early use of s ge i ncentive plans . I t 
1s still widely u.aud ·-; ere unions 1 avo een un bla to win 
cone ss1on3 to er 1 t joint .:.Alrt i c 1 Silt ion 1n t 1e es 11sh-
:..1 13nt of piece .~-es , or atend,rds . . tnce it . a:s pointed out 
in earlier 1aptors ths t unions sec !i ' ae incant ve s en 
... e rnittod to r•o n t~1eir d!n1n1strot1 on, a ide- s read 
lee r t s ttl p · y . a ... 1 me t a 0 1 o ay e 
1 1minat in time . Tlo B rae ant o a • 1d estern te .;:{tile 
comp ny nd te n xt · l o k s ' TJnion of erica , G. I .O. in 
1948 def'1n s t he function o rate s ttin . .., 3S · ollo s : 
I t io u t lly ~reed t 
r tes f or t he various 
cations ah ll continu .. o bo set y 
the employer, on a basis of job con-
tent dete mi .. ad y or n lya1s 1 
atandarda, and time atudy , or such 
o the .... m.et 1 d or ethod · c a y b de-
termined through mutual . agree ent e-
t e tho o ~ l~er · n1 th union. (1) 
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The 1 948 gre ·n n ·t o ' Na· ··'n.gl .and h'lO c!'linery co1 psmy and the 
Intern tional Associ tion or \faci iniats is of si 11isr content. 
(1) Ibid . at page 19 
T union eco .n · ze t; •. a t i t is t 
co pany•s sole respons1 111ty to es-
taul· GA ra to ~ or ri CvO fox partiCU• 
lar operations and to elasoify all 
~'J ... loy e s n ce o d· nc 1 tl: their 
assigned ork. (1) 
3. ·egotlated Piece Ra tes 
The lino etween t joint determination of rates, 
and ne·ot1nt1ons on rate 21~ ia extremely narrow. Rates de-
te 1ned jointly as 1tl so e o!' the needle trades y prove 
to be ne otiated ratea if usineas conditions warrant con-
co.asions· to either m•nagement or a price committee o!' the 
union. Piece :rates or pr1cee dete:r ined jointly <H~ord1ng 
to the amount o!' ork rh1ch an operator c n . r.for , and on 
h1ch reasonable ncent1v earn1n s can be anticipated, are 
not nef"otiated . Broadly sp ak1ng, then, ne ot.~ated ratea 
represent adjust ents in standard rates on oper t1ons which 
have job characteristics unchanged from those in existence 
when the rates were originally determined. An Eastern radio 
nufaoturing cO.tlpany and the UnlteQ. Eleotrieal , R•dio and 
ach1ne orkera of eric ·, o. r.o., outline negotiat ion• on 
piece rates s tollo~ a in the 194 agreement.: 
here t her-e have been no ohQn ea in 
Jll.eth od OI roc!3n , t l e 1.on uree " to 
discus 1th t he company, upon reque$t, 
• l opoa.( t odj t:Jt ·' . r :.:~ll ~e a. 
Any changes in such at ndard rates Wil l 
e ent blis only · pon _utu l c. . !' .e-
ent o the company and the union. (l) 
(1} Ibid. at page 19 
102 
4. Ot her Considerations in ~ate Sett1ru> 
In addition to the questi·.on of whom shall set the 
piece rates or standards, there· are the matters of temporary 
rates , trial periods for rates, and the posting of standards •. 
Temporary rates are piece rates on new jo"ba, the 
conte plated change in content of h1ch prevents the ea-
ta l ishment of standards. Aa t he use of temporary rates ia 
l imited in labor contracts to usually thirty days, beyond 
t hat ti4e permament standard& must be installed. This pre-
vents the extended use of temporary rates wh1eh lack good 
foundation, and insures the installation of reasonable 
.standards. 
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Trial periods, too, are sometimes established dtiring 
which orkers are given an opportunity to test t he rate and 
complain 1f unable to better standard t hrough good performance. 
A:tter t he ne rate has been iven a fair trial, and it is still 
found to be "tigb.ttt, average earnin s ay be paid· tor the time. 
worked on t he n~ job, and another •tandard developed. 
Contract requirements that rates be posted within 
reasonable 11m,1ts of time after determ.1nat1on 1a another method 
of information to the worker to permit quick complaint it neeea-
aary. In moat shops thi a 1s unneceaaacy a1nce etandarda are 
usually attached to Producti on Department papers dispatched 
to the shop. 
D. Ja1nta1n1ng Sol1d~r1ty 1th1n the Union 
The problem ot containing the mem el"sh1p in • wage 
incent ve s 1op . !thin the oundaries or union harmony ia 
frequently diff icult . Suspicion, distrust, and je lousy 
c n endanger the tonure of t he agency origin lly elected to 
llepresent t he orkOl'S . These barriers to aolidar1 ty · i t hin 
t he rank and fil r se from t he very nature of the incentive 
plan nd the nner ln which it is administered . They exist 
under all types of age i ncentive eystems, differing 1n 
quantity and intensity with different pl na . 
·here un11 teral decision y nagemant is the 
ethod of r ate deter 1 at1on, t he union 1 usuall.y in op o-
sition to such a n arrangement, and all complaints against 
rates are directed toward management . Joint p rt1c1p tion, 
or ne·ot1at1ona to es t · llsh r tes,. h owever, involve t e 
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union in totally different set of circumstances . Co pl 1nta 
by orkers ga1nst coepted piece rates or standards may in-
vol ve union leadership 1n controversy 1th t he mem er sh1p. 
The fam111az• experience ot t he Naumkeeg Steam Ootton C'ompany 
nd t h o United Textile •, orkera 1 an excel ant illustration 
of ho union-management eoopera,tion e .n start a gulf' et een 
t he . em e~ship and 1te union leaders . The Union as involved 
in joint research ith na gecent in an effort to reduce 
operating coats . I t was 1'urther involved in the determ1n t1on 
of job aaa1g . ents l attge,ly through t1 e stud1ee . In n ex-
tended period of contracting Ill8rkets and •ors.en1ng economic 
condition~, the Union pol icy o.f reasonableness on both job 
aa.s1gnments. and resaaroh~ led to a loss of obedience y the 
l05 
A atri a by thf .... L ru.uornhip ;ithout the 
s nct_on of 1on o.fficero ms cleUl'"*'CUt l'evolt. Thi s action 
· y t he _ u nd f11 . led Professor E. n . !::-mith (1} i;o t he 
cone uoion that~ AUC a t old t empt y the Union t active~ 
ly participate determ--n ng job oas ,., gn.enta end st ndtirda , 
cont1•ol o." tl1e me er hip,. :t. not po.so1 le A d st ll retr 
for u1y lengt 1 ... t" me . Professor .l.lllller H. Sl1cht r conaura 
t l t: 
T~ Naw~:oa : experience trongly au e ts 
that unions should not assume too much 
r spons1 111ty !or setting jo aas~gn• 
monts or production standardJ~:. (2) 
. ge incentives also tond to influen-ce the ork r 
1nt·o t h inking t t hi fforts alone caused higher earnings. 
The natur 1 tendency is to emphae~1~e the personal effort con-· 
tr1but1on, and relegate union gains 1n either ase wage rates, 
or at ,nd rds, to second pl ce a a c11us of increased nominal 
a g :h The ha:rd .ork ot the union ne.cessa:ry to ga1n conces-
sions on incentiv 1aauea, t ... Qn, is minimized y the em· er-
ship. Th.1 same condition c . rr1 seven .1u.rther into the 
ember-union relationship. orkera under wage 1neent1vea 
y ne leet to prod t e union on 1heont1ve issues and expect 
merely serv1e .nd'. protection on such matters as sen1or1ty, 
holid y pay,. v cation , nd like tssue·a. ·The reeli· may be 
that the orker c ·n rg in ~s o n &gee through performance, 
(1) E. D. Smit , :naehnol,ogy and Labor, 1939 
( 2.) sumner I. S11c lter, Union Pol1c1ea . and Industrial r ana&e-
ment, 1942, page 558 
and. t h!lt +he arv ces of tb union • re not :aequ1rod on '' . e 
ole ves t at 1nce· t1 e s= 
estroy the mass solidarity or the wor_ ~ 
1ng population by making the individual's 
earninas d~pendent more on his own 
efforts than on a ee ents secured by 
h e nion. (1) 
.Jealousies y ea 1ly ariso .. thin h .,. r l! nd 
ila under a w ge incentive, lar gely throu,Gh t he earnin s 
actor. T_e h 1h en:rn1nl:;ls of . o e resulting :f'ro1 ureater 
erf'orm nee, ~nv r:t t1 sm 1n job ass1gnnh:-nts, o ne ~lected 
loos~ standards, provides the basis for th15 jenl.ousy h ioh 
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c n devide the mem .ersh1p. Those with high incentive earn-
ings are usually reluctant to re$pond to a strike vote 1n 
support for highor w& e demands.. Jealousy 1thin the memb~r-
hip m1y als·o build up in another· manne·r. All union mom · ers 
in an incentive shop are not usually covered by the incentive· 
plan. This ollowa for maintenance orkers nd others who 
service the product., or for produot1 ve workers on assignment.a 
which re not easily measured .. If measured day •ork or some 
ot er t1e~1n to t he incentive plan is provided for these work-
er on t he fringe, t e cause fo.r jonlousy msy be elimimtted. 
ut t.f no provisions re made to increase the e rninga or 
t hese workers· som.ewhot in proportion to the earninc;s ot the 
incentive orkera, resentment to ttrd union leadership 1a 
(1) l at1onal I.ndusia•i·al c .onference oa:t'd,. ·inan.cial Inoe.nt1vea, 
Studies in Personnel Policies, No. 217, 1935, ago 2 
l l ;l.Jll:l l . 
• a · 1.ncent1 TJOS 1.nv lve a l.'~nion 1 ew s t o 
ent plont . -;h t>~HiiC 
tool of }lmcnt ·sl tiona 1 s , the l a m~ a c::.;, rEHlf 'nt., 
eeomes ore. n ol,TGd . nd detailed . The num er of po1.nts t1nd 
tee n ~:..C 1 .t1 s .,.t l.llH ;J co r s r eat, .xp nded . ·-i e 
t;:r.ucture and polici s of t h e union also underco change . Ex• 
pert ond quol if ... ecl ·un1.on rap:re sent a.t ... vos r . cess .. Y to 
do l With t~ a rul t i le )l .. Obla G ris n[:; fro (1 ~inistrat 1 ·0n 
of t : o n ;pe i ncentive.. Dongeroun possi.u1.li·t1ea al so ex1at 
i n cert in 1n·st . nc s h1ch can disrupt · and break h r.mony 
within the me ' orship. T e use of w e noentivos , than, in• 
creases t ha burdon· OJ. a union in aat1a.fy!n , the incroaaed· d -
e nds o 1t s renl nd f1le . 
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-Chapterc VI 
SUlliilary and Conclus·1ona 
A. SuGeest1o.ns for .,....et,t.er Incentive Plana 
In Chapter I t he require ents ot .. a good w ge in-
centive plan were outlined. It is to be expected, then,. 
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t t t hese ill be followed . ut beyond these requirements 
t 1ere remains one important aspect hich can greatly in-
nuance t h e future success of wa ge incentives . The complete 
ental revolution y oth workers and management which • • 
Taylor called tor in 1911 has not yet been fulfilled at th1a 
late date . To do ao would relieve much or the tension which 
p~esentl.y exists. 
Labor must e brought to realize t hat increased 
productivity and lower prices caused in part y lower unit 
coats are necessary. Such conditions can be :fulfilled large-
ly through a uao of . age incentives. The 11m1ts to production 
which some economists hold to 'be neal" t hand are actually 
much turther any. Production is ne·ver large enough until 
demand has: been fully satisfied. Effective demand. can e in-
creased hen the productivity of labor both directly lowerll 
t h e oost o·f product·&, and influence a other contri utin coati 
to follow • 
. } ana e t ent , too:J must share in thia realization by 
cooperatin ore with labor on t he wage incentive issue-. It 
ust e clearly und.eratood that incentive administration 1.a 
not a matt r for managerial decision alone. S1noe incentive• 
affect t he conduct of orkers, t hey must include t he human-
itarian principles for which labor has organized and fought 
t hrou h t he years. 
r. uch o this change in t h inking by both lnbor and 
management can be facilitated through standardization. Time 
study practices and principles, as a starting point , should 
be uniform harever applied,. Since t he vari nee in companies 
and t heir application o t ime study is so wide , t his could . e 
a long process. The Society tor Advancemen.t of Uana ement 
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bas been conducting annual conferences on time study and meth-
ods since 1946 in an e:f'f'ort to standardize t h inking on what 
cons titutes a fair day•s work. This may well prov to be a 
beginning toward s t andardization since industry has respond-
ed favors ly to these i nvestigations. 
Possibly, though h rdly, this standardization c n 
only e attained through legislation. Without advocating an 
extension of present top- heavy government controls in labor 
relat i ons, ot l e st t e threat of such interference i ght 
have the desired effect. The Depart ~ent of Labor , i n any 
event , could assist in seeking a greement etween s uch rcups 
as t he f, stional Association of .1anufacturers, and top leaders 
in labor on wage incentive :fundamentals. The .favors le ex-
periences o:f many industries or c ompanies , and t heir associat-
ed unions , could very well be the s tarting point to t hese 
attempts at standardization. The limits to incentive applic.-
ation could possi ly be defined. Certainly a reduction in 
t h e num or of plans no 'l 1n e 1stence could be accompl i shed . 
An enforce ent o.f t hese agreemente i gh.t not prove 
·to e as d1tt1cul t as 1t f irst appe rs . Genera l standard-
ization on other matters as een po.ssi le lth out govern• 
mental intervention . ijege incentive pl ns standardized in 
oth principl and detail can .ll prov to b t ho key to 
eneral suocessf'ul a pplication i n t he future. 
tion or ttitudes 
Or ganized l or is not in agreement on the su jeot 
o · a :Je i ncentives . Pepende t upon th con 1t1on h ich the 
incentive 1 p oses upon bot t he worlcer and union leadersh ip, 
t here is a id va:r•iet.y or opinion. '.r.he .~.~at1onal rotherhood 
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o Operative Potters has had f'avora le experiences in t h e mat-
t e r and 1s aga inst t1 e payment in t he industry. This 1a ch ief-
l y becau e ot' t he nature of the ~ ork where y prices. or stand-
ards re easily assigned. . The ork of t b. rohip of t h e 
Internati onal. Typograph1cal Un1on, on t lle other hand, is so 
1ncal.cula le as to influence the Union into s t rong opposition 
to wa ge i ncentive payment . 1ork .cont . nt 6 t h en, is a jor 
t ctor whi ch leads so e un1ona t o a reference for incentives, 
and oth ers t o a prefere!lco :for t1 e paynent . 
The met h od of determining production atandarda is 
another cRuse o · unions d1f.fer1ng i dely on the aubject . Th1a 
in particular deta il ro.lates dtreetly to un113teral time 
study by ana gement . Such one- sided action was .a contri ut1ng 
r gmn.ent to the decision of t he lnternst1onal Union of 
United -)uto. oo i ·le• Alrcrll t 1 and Agricul t ural Implement 
··ork r s of! erica to press for n ~f ondonment of w ge. 1n-
centlves l n the l ata l 930 •e. \here there have oaen union• 
anagement negotl tiona sl 111 r to OS y indus t ry nd 
the Amal gamated Cloth ing ·orkers of "merica , ther e is evi-
dence of greem ·nt -
These conflicting experi ences and ttitudes of 
unions do not n eessarlly m:...an that t·ere ore conti nuous 
d s gre .... ments et':reen unions o posing '16 [; i n ce!1t1ves and 
:m~no ';emo.nt 1~1lch desire to uae this ethod of r ... d:ucing unit 
costs . there u ion op,?os1t1on is .severe , it is usually true 
that inc nt1ve meth o s ro ' endoned nd t h e u n.:i.on s tis..~..ied A 
If' i nc ,ntlve payment is eccepta · le to the 1.mion , it 1s also 
accep t8ble to m~meg ment , nd i d. - sprQ d extension of s ys -
tems x.ist . There 1.s a certain amount ot' h armony 1n the 
:f'i · l d o£ 1 oor .. ,. nagem.ent r l .e.tions rel . t:i ve t o wa "' 6 inc r.t"" 
t ive s , .ror union op position fost rs chi efly i!hen pl ns :re 
impos u on t. e em r ship . La: or is eu1•rently i n a :. oa1t1on 
hereoy 1 t affects d cis ions by manage ent t o t h.a .. : tent t 1a t 
i n gener l hel"'G i ncentives ere O.)p0sed t h y have · en elim ... 
i nated or od 1f1ed,. 
The out s tandi ng conclusion of t h 1$ study i .s t hot 
mos t unJ.. ons acce t a ~.:,e i ne ant1vo .• only 'hen t h e union is 
g iven some vo1-c i n the dmini":stration of' det·a1ls. E i ,_.)n t of 
t he nine f' vora 1 res onses by la ox' to th questiormoire 
of this s t udy were qualified ith t he prerequisite t h a t the 
lU 
-. 
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incentive not be unilateral by management . .Labor will not 
accept systems 11' management is t he sole judge and t he ork-
er is expected to conform to all 1mpo.sed re .· a tions.. In 
brief, labor 1.s opposed to some of t he early concepts of 
scientific management. 
Th~\.S opposi tlon ha·s brought a bout several i mportant 
changes i n age incentive administration. In many i nstances, 
piece rates or .Production standards are negotiated across t he 
table. Such concessions reflect either the ab111ty of the 
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employ er to allow great.er standards or rates, or the union to 
:f'orce hi~h p iece ra t es t hrough its strengt h . The question o£ 
worker ab1l1ty·to per!'orm at a predetermined pace is not usual• 
l y involved . 
Joint participation in t e de termination of piece 
t•rJ tes may or may not al · o incl ude this matter of or ker a 11-
i ty . mhis joint pa:rt1c1pa,tion f requentl y includes t he tool 
of time study w1tl studies conducted by both :management en-
gineers and uni on representatives . Suc h n arrangement can 
be more properly t ermed a check on ma.negement to see that pre-
determined pri nciples .are followed. 
lliere the .union has been unsuccessful in obtaining 
either t he pi•ivilege to negotiate piece rate$ or to partici-
pate jointly with mans gement in establishing th~sa rates , it 
concentra tes on the labor contract. Gu rantees to incentive 
e r n 1n s,. and clauses and sections to safeguard the · orke r 
a gainst possible abuseS. 1n admi nistra t ion are negotia t ed and 
included 1n the grec ent. Frequently this represents a 
wide dep rture from ea·rly principles. as outlined oy !J.taylor 
and his aaaoo1atea. 'l'he dangei .. s poasiole to union eoli• 
dar:tty when labor involves itself" in wage incentive adminis• 
tration details 1s given little cone1der$t1on, for unions 
continue to insist upon s haring 1n this adt:linistrat1on. 
l.l3 
Anoth6r factor · ~hieh this study has brought into 
prominence is the enlightened economic thinking of any labor 
leaders. Specific. compet i tive problems have in some instances 
influenced acceptance of wage incentives All a ethod of 1n-
crea.a1ng .earning s hile cont.ainlng un t .• la or costs . Converse-
ly, there _are still some who continue along t he stuoborn ve·tn, 
using the old bogey of fear of the apeed•up as n argument . 
There are others who continue to oppose incentives ecause o:r 
past unfavorable experiences . They . fail to us.e rather rGcent-
ly de.veloped union atrength to fo:rce oonceaaions on incentive · 
issues to make them more equ!ta·ble ~nd aceepta'ble. 
:Finally., i t should be pointed out that labor has 
more ar ents a f!a1nst wage incentive.a than it h!!s t .o promote 
a receptive attitude. The very pv.1nc1ples o:f incentives are 
foreign to t he natures of mltny workers . Seient.1f1c manage• 
ment, 1n addition. had an unfortunate beginning and the mem-
ories of this experience are well ... recorded. The penaltie•. 
of incentive payment , the sllortcomings o.f time study an lysis, 
and the urdens placed on union leadership in incentive sh op• 
also 1n.tluence negative att:ttudoa.. Aligned against these ia 
t he .. pol'tant m · ·ter of nominal ages , or earn1n0 s . Vhethor 
t hese 1 C"rler e rn ngs out• weigh t he unfavor,_ ble aspectfJ i a 
metter £or individual consideration by d1tf'e:!'ent un1o.ns. 
App l~ently they do in some innt ncet, tor acceptance hinge a 
on t .:1.o qu esti on of e~r.nln!!~ ,. Ce tninly t hey vr111 in t he 
futu1,a w!J.en wage 1ncre3ses :raus1; be ~oined \Vi t hout increas i ng 
unit labor aosts . 
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Direct 11 aolieit lone ere forwarded 1 
ovem e:r, 1949, to seventy- five of the la:rger un1on3 reque.t .. 
ng 1n£o t1o c one rning eac-..b. union • e attitu e toward wage 
incentives. A queetionn 1.re wae 1ncl.o ed in an effort to e•-
ta. lish p ttern in tabulat.ing the repl ie • Sel t - dd:reaaed, 
st :mped envelopes of the writer were 1nQ.luded to f& c1l.1tate 
returns . 
Tw nty replies 1 il'ere reoeived, or 2? pe:r cent of the 
total m 111ng . 1ve of these replies were either blank, or 
cont inod no 1nforr:vlt on rela t ive to the study. Of the re-
ma1n1n~ fl.fteen replica ,. nine· ere interpreted as favorable 
tow rd . ccept nee of lV . e 1noenti ve:~ , and 1x were :ttecorded 
galnst th · . y.ot er-sl of wa ge dete.rmin t1on.. An interesting 
observ t1on is· t h t o t union~ d1al1ke being "pinned down" 
to spen1fic tormfl as outlined in the questionnaire.- Actually 
only six of the twenty informative replies ua~d . t ' e qu~stio~-
na1re. 
Tho. e individual replies l 1arted 1n favor of wage in-
centives are as followa : 
Beard,,. Leland, International l .at Vice President , 
Federation of u~a a, Oeramic ancl Silica Sand \ ork.era 
oi' Aiiierlc.a, c.f.5. ' ... 
jjOokb1nder, H. H., Aa:s1atant Director of Re•esrch, 
Amalsanu~ted Clothi~g . tlorkers of America, A.F .L. 
115 
n•v1son, Sol• Associate Director,. Reseal"ah & Education 
Dep r ,t ment, United 'l1ext1le ~orkers of America , A .f~ .L. 
DuffY', Ja . G8 ., P! a :J:i.dont 1 r ational Brotherho<Xl ot Operative Potters, . A..F .L. · · · 
- . I 
Goldfinger, I at, Research Director, United Paper-
.,.urlcer c of mner =.u c: , .c .. I .o. 
T:Ien n, D v1d, ucat on . irector) Uphclct a l'OJ:'. ' 
International Union of~ North Americ , A.~• .t. · 
agu1re; 1111a •. , Director of Research, Re.tail 
Clerks Intern"'tion l . A .soc1 t i on1 A.F .L. 
n g:ran, G., L., Vice ?reu1dent, O£t1ce Et.1ployeea 
Intern tional Union, A.F.L. · 
ll6. 
Stan,. .tark, E.ducat1on Director, Internat1ona~ I,ad1ea' 
(l ;:uent \' orl,e):'s Union , . 1\ . li:I .L .• 
ainst ttga incent i ves for any of 
eve· al r easo . re s f'ollowo: 
* D r kin, Soio on, Director of 1 e e~ r ah, Toxt1la 
orkera Union ot Ameriga, c.I.o. · · 
nrown,. Elmer, Vi.ce Pre•1dent1 Int&rnational Tyeo• 
Sl'aphical Union,, A. F .L • .' · · 
Burt z,. V1rgU1 Dir ecto1, , He .uoarch nd ucat.~.on Department, :r,nternational oodworkera of America, c.I .. O. 
Carl1ner. Lewia_, Managing Editor,. ttAmlnun1t1on", 
ducnt1on Department. ·Uni t ed AutOiiiob1l:G A1roraftt 
and Agricultural Itnplemen~ Workera of . er!aa, e. .o. 
tor t he Proa1den~, 
of .Bookbinders, A~F .L. 
IJ:lompeon, Fred, Editoriol R search D1rector1 
Ind.uatri . l Workers of t h .· orld 
* Barkin'• r$ply was in th e f or.m of two addreases he made wh1le 
representing the Union . They were inter.·preted aa being un• 
i'avorable to an acceptance of wage 1nc·ent1ves •·• they re now 
generally admin1etered. 
·ovember 18 # 1949 
Dee r ir : 
Your help 1s el ici t ed on t h e VC"Jltuna I ao. preparing 
ent i t led nr,a orts At ti t ude Tow rd Wa ..,.e Incent i ves." The main 
t heme will cover organized l obor' a. eu.rz ent t h inki ng on t he 
mat t er, wit h rea ·ons suppo:t' t in eithe·r rejecti on o~ cceptance 
of wus a ineent i ve payra.or1t . I .... l .. t icu.l r- a ttfJntion ·ll.l be de-
voted t ·o systems Gatabl1sh ed f rom time study data. 
~1lo any printed pamphle ts or r ticles will be 
. a t efully a ccopt od , I p!u·ticul arl y invite re spons ibl e sta t e-
ments outl ini n g t he cu.rront pos iti.on of your organ i zation re-
g<u•di.ng the ;;: t.bj ect . In any event , 111 you ploose com:r J.et e 
t he eceo panying questionnaire and ret UI'h i t i n t he i nclosed 
cJel .f- dd i· r-t~ e ~ .~tn . pe . nvelopo . 
Thomes F. c rroll 
8.2 South Hunt i ngt on .Avenue 
Bos ton 30 , -~ n aehu ett a 
TFC:C 
Ene. 
~11\M." ~ -Q~J:L 
• 4 0 1'!16!"'' F . c l '!'Oll 
Mem er,. Fed . of' Vi estinghouse 
Ind~pend nt Sel~r1ed Uniono 
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ovemoer 1949 
amc of orP.anita.tion: 
Total- membership: 
Ap9roximate peree11tage of total membership under we.ge incentives: -----------
.tti tude toward wage incentives: Complete accept ance Rc;luctant acceptance Rejscti on Others _ _ _ 
Experience 1t'i th 'fiage incentives: Favorabl 
---- Fair trn.f.avorable Others-· --
age i ncentives should be : :F'xpo.nded Ret ained Abolished ___ _ 
Signed ------------------~ 
Title 
~ 
,_, 
.... 
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